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JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal from a domestic relations case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did Judge Dever err in assessing Defendant's income, and 
consequently err in the amount of child support and alimony that he 
awarded? 
This issue involves questions of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. E.g. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 
App. 1986). 
This issue was preserved (e.g. 1468-1483, 1628, 1598-1605). 
2. Did Judge Dever err factually and legally in setting the 
alimony award? 
This issue involves mixed questions of fact and law. The 
Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless they 
are clearly erroneous, and reviews the legal conclusions for 
correctness. E.g. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 
App. 1986). 
This issue was preserved (e.g. 1473-1480, Plaintiff's exhibit 
132) . 
3. Did Judge Dever err in failing to divide the C&G retirement 
account? 
This issue appears to involve mixed questions of fact and law. 
The Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless 
they are clearly erroneous, and reviews the legal conclusions for 
correctness. E.g. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 
App. 1986). 
This issue was preserved (e.g. 2645-2649). 
4. Did Judge Dever err in failing to order David Griffith to 
pay Janna Griffith's attorney fees? 
Rulings on attorney fees are normally reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Finlavson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
This issue was preserved (1502-23). 
5. Should Judge Dever have vacated the orders signed by Judge 
Rokich after Judge Rokich recused himself from this case? 
This issue involves questions of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. See e.g. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) . 
This issue was preserved in the trial court (e.g. 983-1002, 
1010-1027, 1042-1059) . 
6. Did Judge Dever err in awarding attorney fees as a result 
of Mrs. Griffith's motion to disqualify defense counsel, Robert 
McDonald? 
This issue involves questions of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. See e.g. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) . 
This issue was preserved in the trial court (e.g. 793-804). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
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The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
pertain, and are copied in the addendum to this brief: Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (1996), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
(1996), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (1997), Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 63 (1997), Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1997), Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5 (1994 Cum. Supp., Repl. Vol 3B), 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1997), Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 (1987 Repl. 
Vol), and Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (1994 Cum. Supp., Repl. Vol. 
9). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION 
Janna Griffith filed a complaint seeking a divorce from David 
Gary Griffith on September 14, 1994 (1-11). Janna was represented 
by J. Franklin Allred, and David was initially represented by Bruce 
Richards, and then by Robert McDonald (11, 16, 32). 
Judge John Rokich originally presided over the case, but 
recused himself after one day of trial (1756-1762). 
Judge L.A. Dever then presided over the case, granting a 
decree of divorce on June 3, 1996, ruling that the child custody, 
property division, child support and alimony issues would be 
resolved following a full trial (1225-1231). Judge Dever presided 
over a trial in August of 1996, and entered a supplemental decree 
of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 
10, 1997 (1704-1747). 
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Janna Griffith filed a timely notice of appeal on March 3, 
1997 (1750-51). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Janna Griffith and David Gary Griffith were married on 
November 12, 1976 (2177). 
At the time of trial, Janna Griffith was forty-one years old, 
and David was thirty-eight years old, and their four children 
ranged in age from ten to seventeen years (2081, 2084). 
At the outset of the marriage, David attended college, while 
Janna worked full-time as a bank teller (2079). David worked 
throughout the marriage for the family construction company, 
Christensen and Griffith (hereinafter "C&G"), and began working 
full-time for C&G in 1977 (2078). He worked initially as a 
laborer, and advanced to become a construction manager (2078). 
During the course of the marriage, she was the primary 
caretaker of the children and devoted eight years exclusively to 
that role (2164, 2166) . Janna supplemented her high school 
education with some banking courses (2161). Janna worked off and 
on as a bank teller at various banks, and also did office work and 
served as a runner for C&G (2160-64). 
Janna was always supportive of David's efforts on behalf of 
C&G, traveling with him to various remote construction sites and 
raising some of their small children while living in trailers on 
the construction sites (2173-76). They did not move into their 
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home until 1983 (2172) . Janna was not compensated for her work for 
C&G in the early years of their marriage (2087). 
Particularly from her discussions with David's father, Janna 
expected that the joint efforts of her and her husband on behalf of 
C&G would pay off financially for her and her family in the future, 
when David would inherit his share of the family business (2162, 
2371-74). 
Janna and David separated in April or May of 1994, after David 
informed Janna of his extra-marital affair (2251, 2254). 
After the separation, Janna stayed with the children and 
worked full time as a bank teller, and also worked every other 
Sunday at a gas station (2153, 2160-61). 
David moved in with his parents, continued driving the company 
car and using gas and service for the car paid for by C&G, and 
charged several thousand dollars' worth of vacations and other 
personal expenses to a C&G credit card, while the company 
maintained no record of David's debts (2024, 2034, 2822-26, 2592-
93) . 
Shortly after the separation, David Griffith, with the help of 
his family and family business, C&G, began maneuvering to minimize 
Janna's financial recovery from the divorce. For instance, David 
opted to abstain from taking his annual bonus of $15,000 in 1994 
(2062). He later took a company car valued at $9,500 for his 
daughter after the bonus would have been distributed (2790). 
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Shortly after the separation, David ceased performing side 
jobs for C&G, which side jobs had previously earned David and 
Janna's family some $13,206 per year, and which had principally 
been used to improve their family home (2212, 2231).1 
David testified that he quit doing side jobs shortly after the 
separation from Janna, completing the last project by the Spring of 
1995 (2068-69). He testified that he stopped performing the side 
jobs because the family home was completed and he had no further 
interest, and because of his increasing responsibilities at work at 
C&G stemming from his brother's illness and father's political 
activities (2068). He testified that David's brother's leukemia 
and David's father's increasing responsibilities as a Tooele County 
Commissioner resulted in David's spending more time and effort at 
C&G (2073-77). 
David testified that he did not request a salary increase to 
compensate him for his extra work for C&G, because it was a family 
business (2063). 
Gary Griffith, C.E.O. of C&G, with 70% of the voting stock 
(2452, 2485), 
confirmed that his son David would not receive additional 
compensation for his extra efforts at C&G in compensating for 
Paul's and Gary's absence (2449). He did, however, testify that 
1
 Because records were not kept on many of the side jobs, 
and because the side jobs were not reported on tax forms, the 
exact figures on this income are not available (2248, 2294-2301). 
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David used the company credit cards to support himself, and that 
the company kept no records of D'avid' s debt to the company, and 
simply left it up to David to determine how to pay back the company 
(2592-93).2 
David's father, Gary Griffith, gave several thousand dollars' 
worth of company stock to David's grandmother, with the intention 
of transferring the stock to David after the divorce as part of 
David's inheritance (2369). This arrangement was made in an effort 
to prevent Janna from getting any benefit from the transfer (2369). 
During discovery, David Griffith represented that his share of 
the C&G profit sharing plan was valued at $3,650.84 (Plaintiff's 
exhibit 10), when in fact, that figure represented the value of a 
small annuity, and the true value of the profit sharing plan was 
$63,981.17 (Plaintiff's exhibit 11). 
After Judge Dever issued his original order preceding the 
supplemental decree, counsel for Mr. Griffith filed a motion 
attempting to persuade Judge Dever that Mr. Griffith's salary at 
C&G's bookkeeping methods have historically facilitated 
David Griffith's efforts to minimize his apparent income. The 
comptroller of C&G testified that the company maintained no 
records concerning what David owed the company as a result of his 
use of company equipment, supplies and credit in performing side 
jobs (2432-34, 2404). The comptroller testified that David has 
had access to company equipment, supplies and credit, and was 
trusted to keep his own records and reimburse the company (2428-
30) . 
The same comptroller prepared David and Janna's taxes, and 
was aware that David did not report on his taxes his side job 
income or unrestricted use of a company car, car maintenance, and 
gas (2420, 2409-15, 2408-9, 2406-07). 
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C&G was $970 a week, rather than $1020 a week, as Mr. Griffith 
testified at trial (1640, 2065). The motion also attempted to 
persuade the court to account for Janna Griffith's earning $211 per 
month in interest income, when in fact, the exhibit upon which he 
relied demonstrated that she earned a total of $211 in the entire 
year of 1995, and demonstrated no interest income for Janna in 1996 
(1640, 1688). 
Janna and David's divorce was complete and final on February 
10, 1997 (1704-1747). 
Additional facts are stated in the argument portion of the 
brief, as they pertain to the issues raised. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Dever's assessment of David Griffith's income was 
incorrect in three respects: he should have included David's 
history of side-job income; he should have included David's income 
from the possession, use and maintenance of the company car; and he 
assessed Mr. Griffith's annual bonus on the basis of a historical 
average, rather than on the basis of the most current figures. The 
errors in Judge Dever's assessment of David Griffith's income 
resulted in an erroneous calculation of child support and alimony. 
In assessing the alimony award, Judge Dever failed to consider 
the proper factors, and granted an award that was inadequate and 
unfair. 
Judge Dever also erred in the property division, in failing to 
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divide David's retirement account at C&G. This was qualitatively 
by far the best asset earned by the Griffiths during the course of 
their marriage, and no other assets awarded to Mrs. Griffith 
compensated for the lack of her fair share of the retirement 
account. 
In denying Janna Griffith attorney fees, Judge Dever failed to 
make adequate findings. Proper consideration of the issue 
indicates that the fees requested were reasonable, that Janna 
Griffith was unable to pay them, and that David should have been 
ordered to do so. 
Judge Rokich erred in adjudicating the issue of attorney fees 
after he disqualified himself from presiding over this case. His 
judgment and orders were illegal by virtue of his preceding 
recusal, and also by virtue of the fact that there was no basis for 
the orders in fact or in law. Judge Dever should have vacated the 
orders signed by Judge Rokich after his recusal. 
There was no basis for imposing rule 11 sanctions for Janna 
Griffith's motion to disqualify defense counsel. Because Judge 
Dever's order was induced by an incorrect view of the law and is 
without evidentiary support, this Court should reverse it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN 
ASSESSING DAVID GRIFFITH'S INCOME. 
A. RELEVANT FACTS 
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1. Side Job Income 
From 1983 to 1995, David Griffith earned side job income 
averaging $13,206 per year (2212). Because no records were kept 
on many of the side jobs, and because the side jobs were not 
reported on tax forms, the exact figures on this income were not 
available (2248, 2294-2301). 
The side job income was used to the benefit of David and Janna 
and their four children, primarily in improving the family home 
(2231) . 
The side jobs involved David using equipment and supplies from 
C&G to complete independent projects after hours, or work C&G had, 
which it was unable to complete during regular hours (2069-72). 
The company policy permitted work with employees to use company 
equipment and supplies and credit, and anticipated that the 
employees would reimburse the company (2454, 2475-79) . The company 
did not maintain records on David Griffith's use of or 
reimbursement for use of the company credit card or the other 
benefits, and relied on David to keep his own records (2425-28, 
2592-93). 
David testified that he quit doing side jobs shortly after the 
separation from Janna, completing the last project by the Spring of 
1995 (2068-69) . He testified that he stopped the side jobs because 
the family home was completed and he had no reason to do more side 
jobs (2068). He then testified that David's brother's leukemia and 
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his father's increasing responsibilities as a Tooele County 
Commissioner resulted in David's spending more time and effort at 
C&G (2073-77) . 
Evidence presented by Janna established that if David were 
paid for performing the 80% of Paul's job he claimed to have been 
doing, he should have been paid an annual salary of $80,704 (2187-
90), rather than the approximate $54,000 David testified he was 
being paid (2065) . David testified that he did not request a salary 
increase to compensate him for his extra work, because it was a 
family business (2063). 
Judge Dever agreed with David that this side job income should 
not be included in his income for calculating child support and 
alimony, ruling that David's uncompensated increasing 
responsibilities at C&G, stemming from Paul Griffith's leukemia and 
Gary Griffith's mounting responsibilities as a Tooele County 
Commissioner, justified David's ceasing to perform the side jobs 
(1628). The judge ruled that David had testified that his extra 
efforts at C&G were essential to the viability of the company 
(1628), despite the absence of any testimony to this effect. The 
court ruled that Mr. Griffith was not voluntarily underemployed, 
and that there was no basis for imputing side job income 
historically earned or income he should have received for 
performing 80 % of Paul Griffith's job (1723-24). 
2. Company car income 
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As part of his employment at C&G, David Griffith was given 
full use of a 1995 Chevy Suburban, and all service and gas for the 
car was paid for by C&G (2407-9). Mr. Allred's written proffer of 
evidence from witness, Becky Roderick, set the value of the car, 
service and gas at $10,289.72 (1598-1605). 
At trial on August 8,. 1996, Judge Dever refused to allow Mr. 
Allred to admit the evidence proffered on the value of the car and 
services and gas, or on the value of one of David's side jobs, on 
the theory that Mr. Allred had violated a continuing obligation to 
notify opposing counsel of witnesses he would call at trial (2333). 
Because Mr. McDonald did not file discovery documents seeking 
information on Mr. Allred's witnesses, Mr. Allred's duty to provide 
a witness list was the result of a minute entry entered at Mr. 
McDonald's request stating, ". . . the Court orders that exchange 
of witnesses to be completed by Friday, the 26th day of July, 
1996." (2330, 1372). Despite the fact that the witnesses on the 
value of the car, services and gas, and side job, were not located 
until after July 26, 1996, the court barred the witnesses from 
testifying because Mr. Allred had failed to notify opposing counsel 
of his intent to call the witnesses (2330). 
On August 8, 1996, Allred moved to reopen his case to present 
the testimony of the two witnesses at the continued trial on August 
13, 1996, arguing that this would provide opposing counsel with 
sufficient notice to investigate and rebut her testimony (1492) . 
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Judge Dever denied the motion (1634). 
3. Bonus income 
David Griffith earned the following bonuses in the following 
years: $2,500 in 1990, 0 in 1991; $4,000 in 1992, $5,000 in 1993, 
$15,000 in 1994, and $12,000 in 1995 (2063, 2787, 2790). The 
company bonuses were determined by David's father, Gary Griffith 
(who had 70 percent of the voting stock of the company) and by Ron 
Christensen (who had 30 percent of the voting stock of the 
company) , and were not guaranteed at any particular level (2485, 
2449, 2445). 
Rather than assessing David's income on the basis of his 
current income, Judge Dever opted to average the total bonuses for 
six years in determining David's income (1628). His rationale in 
doing so was to avoid acrimony between Janna and David that might 
ensue if they were forced to recalculate David's child support 
obligations annually (1725-26). 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
1. Side job income 
In ruling that there was no basis for imputing the 
historically earned side job income to David Griffith in setting 
David's child support obligations, the court disregarded numerous 
precedents from this Court. 
Particularly where David Griffith's side job income stemmed so 
directly from his primary employment (the side jobs involved 
13 
David's using C&G's equipment and supplies to complete projects or 
projects for C&G customers that C&G was unable to finish during 
regular work hours (2069-72)) , it would have been proper to include 
the side job income in assessing Mr. Griffith's continuing 
obligations to his children. This is seen by reference to Jensen 
v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995).3 
While David did testify in accordance with the trial court's 
findings, that as a result of his brother's illness and his 
father's political activities, David was doing more work at C&G 
which prevented him from doing side jobs (2073-77), David's first 
explanation of why he ceased performing the side jobs was that the 
family home was complete and he had no reason to do any more side 
jobs (2068). 
Particularly in light of the evidence in the record and 
discussed in the statement of facts, supra, about how David 
3
 In Jensen, this Court upheld a trial court's award of 
child support which relied on income from the defendant 
physician's second job as the county jail physician. The trial 
court reasoned and this Court agreed that consideration of the 
second job was appropriate because the income from the second job 
could be viewed as emanating from the physician's primary job. 
This Court acknowledged that the trial court's calculation may 
well have contemplated a work week that exceeded forty hours, but 
ruled that this is permissible practice if such hours were 
"consistent with the obligee's prior practice." Ld. at n.3 
(citations omitted). See also Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 950 
(Utah App. 1990) (trial court properly based child support award 
on history of overtime, and, rather than speculating that the 
defendant would decrease his overtime work, opted to permit 
modification of the order in the future if those circumstances 
arose). 
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Griffith and his family business began maneuvering to minimize 
Janna's financial recovery from the divorce shortly after their 
separation, the trial court should not have accepted David's loss 
of interest in improving the family home or other excuses to 
disregard David's history of earnings from the side jobs. See 
H2_rL_y. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah 1993).4 
While David Griffith's choice to work to support his brother 
and father in their times of need may seem laudable, David Griffith 
did not have the legal option to elevate the needs of his father 
and brother over the needs of his wife and children, to whom he 
owed a legal duty of support.5 When Mr. Griffith decided that he 
had no further interest, and quit doing the side-jobs, he 
disregarded his primary familial obligations and is properly 
characterized as being voluntarily underemployed. See Hill, supra. 
The trial court should have imputed income to David to account 
for the historical side job earnings, or to account for the salary 
4
 In Hill, when the marriage broke up, a husband and 
father of five left high paying job and took lower paying jobs. 
Id. at 964-65. Despite Mr. Hill's contention that he left the 
higher paying job because his wife ordered him out of the county 
when they split up, the trial court found that Mr. Hill was 
voluntarily underemployed, because he had "voluntarily 
disregarded his familial obligations" in leading the more 
lucrative job. Id. at 965. This Court approved of the trial 
court's setting child support and alimony obligations on the 
basis of three years of regular and overtime wages from his 
previous job. Id. at 965-66. 
5
 See Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3(1) ("Every father shall 
support his child; and every man shall support his wife when she 
is in need."). 
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David should have been earning for the work he was doing without 
visible compensation at C&G.6 
Particularly in the context of setting the alimony award, the 
law is abundantly clear that the trial court should have included 
Mr. Griffith's historical side job income in setting David's 
obligations.7 
This Court should remand this to the trial court for 
correction of the child support and alimony orders, to incorporate 
the side job income. 
2. Company car income 
As noted above, the trial court's refusal to consider as 
income David Griffith's unrestricted use of the company car, 
service and gasoline was based on Mr. Allred's failure to comply 
with a perceived continuing duty to supplement his witness list, as 
a result of the trial court's order to produce a witness list by a 
certain date. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), continuing discovery 
duties apply only to responses to discovery requests, or to court 
6
 See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7) (b) ("If income is 
imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community."); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993). 
7
 See e.g. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 
(Utah App. 1995); Crompton v. Crompton. 888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 
1994); Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Hill, supra; 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5. 
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orders indicating a continuing duty. 
In the instant matter, Mr. McDonald did not file a discovery 
request, and so Mr. Allred was not under any duty to supplement any 
response. Judge Dever's order did not impose a continuing 
obligation to update Mr. Allred's witness list, and Mr. McDonald 
simply relied on the Court's order, and did not himself request any 
updated information after Mr. Allred submitted his witness list in 
compliance with the trial court's order that the lists be exchanged 
by July 26, 1996 (2330-33, 1372). 
In these circumstances, Mr. Allred had no duty to supplement 
his witness list with witnesses found after his initial compliance 
with the trial court's order. At a minimum, the trial court could 
have granted Mr. Allred's motion to reopen his case, if the court 
wished to provide Mr. McDonald with additional time to prepare to 
cross-examine or rebut the witness. The exclusion of this evidence 
substantially undercut both the child support and alimony awards, 
and should have been considered in assessing Mr. Griffith's 
obligations. 8 
8
 See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (1)(a) defining 
gross income for purposes of child support as including "income 
from any source, including non-earned sources11); Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-2(7) (defining earnings as follows: "compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, 
salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and specifically 
includes periodic payment pursuant to pension or retirement 
programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings 
specifically includes all gain derived from capital, from labor, 
or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or 
conversion of capital assets."); Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 
877 (Utah App. 1995)("This court has previously held that when 
17 
3. Bonus income 
As noted above, Judge Dever refused to consider Mr. Griffith's 
historical side job income in assessing income imputable to him as 
a result of his voluntary unemployment. Yet, it the context of Mr. 
Griffith's earned bonuses, the judge insisted on relying on an 
historical average, rather than the most current information. 
Rather than assessing Mr. Griffith's income from his bonus in 
accordance with the most current year, 1995, in which Mr. Griffith 
received $12,000, Judge Dever opted to average the bonuses David 
received in the past six years, attributing only $6,416 in annual 
income from the bonuses (1628, 2063, 2787, 2790). 
This approach was inconsistent with this Court's clear 
indication that income is to be determined on the basis of current 
figures, rather than averages, in setting child support 
obligations. In Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah 1991), 
this Court stated, "Moreover, the trial court averaged Mr. 
Thronson's earned income for several years rather than using 
'current earnings.' Section 78-45-7.5(5) (b) indicates that current 
earnings are to be used." JEd. at 434.9 
On remand in this case, this Court should instruct the trial 
determining an alimony award, "it is appropriate and necessary 
for a trial court to consider all sources of income that were 
used by the parties during their marriage to meet their self-
defined needs, from whatever source -- overtime, second job, self 
employment, etc., as well as unearned income."). 
9
 As noted above, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2(7) includes 
bonuses within the definition of earnings. 
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court to redetermine Mr. Griffith's income in accordance with his 
most recent bonus. See id. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD 
WAS IMPROPER. 
A. RELEVANT FACTS 
Janna submitted detailed records in support of her claimed 
monthly expenses of $4155.44 (Plaintiff's exhibits 132, 136, 137, 
138, 139140, 141, 142) . David testified that he had no specific 
information, but thought that Janna's estimates of family cost of 
living were significantly inflated (2010). While the comptroller 
for C&G testified that he could not account for all of Janna's 
claimed expenses in reviewing her financial records, he conceded 
that the records were incomplete, and did not account for cash 
transactions (2792-2803, 2761-68). 
In assessing Janna's needs, Judge Dever first found that Janna 
Griffith failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that her needs were as claimed, $4115.44 a month (1627). He found 
that David claimed that $2910 was the correct amount to attribute 
for monthly expenses, despite the fact that David Griffith 
testified that he had no specific information, but generally felt 
that Janna's listed expenses were inflated (2010-2012). 
Despite the fact that Janna claimed $4115.44 a month and that 
David supposedly claimed that $2910 was the correct amount, Judge 
Dever found that the "undisputed" amount of expenses was $2,806 
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(1627) .10 
Judge Dever indicated that the $2806 figure was to have 
accounted for the "mortgage, utilities, food, clothing, automobile 
expenses, cable T.V., newspapers and books, haircuts, and 
entertainment" requested by Janna and uncontested by David (1627) . 
However, adding up the figures on plaintiff's exhibit 132 for the 
listed expenses results in a total of $3139.81 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
132) . 
Under his ruling, Judge Dever allowed Janna Griffith nothing 
for maintenance of her home and yard, for tithing and charitable 
Judge Dever's assessment of the relative positions of 
the parties was further confused by the trial court's reliance on 
a purported agreement by David Griffith to pay 8 0 percent of the 
expenses stemming from his children's extra-curricular activities 
and some insurance expenses, when in fact, this agreement was 
contingent on the court's awarding no alimony. In the original 
order, Judge Dever stated, 
The plaintiff argues that her monthly expenses are 
$4115.44. The defendant disputes this amount and 
claims that $2910 is the correct amount. Part of the 
difference is realized by the defendant's agreement to 
absorb 80% of the dance and school activities costs and 
insurance costs relating to him and his daughter. The 
defendant does not dispute the plaintiff's claims for 
mortgage, utilities, food, clothing, automobile 
expenses, cable T.V., newspapers and books, haircuts, 
and entertainment. The undisputed amount is $2806. 
(1627). The court, however, never ordered David Griffith to pay 
in accordance with the purported agreement. 
As Mr. McDonald noted after the entry of the court's order, 
the purported agreement to pay 80% of expenses such as those 
stemming from the children's extra-curricular activities was 
contingent on the court not awarding alimony (1685). 
Nonetheless, in the final decree and supporting findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, Judge Dever relied on the purported 
agreement in rationalizing the disparities between the estimated 
expenses, again without ordering Mr. Griffith to comply with the 
agreement (1720-21). 
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contributions, for her own prescriptions, for laundry and dry 
cleaning, medical expenses, dental expenses, car insurance, life 
insurance, or for several expenses for the children, such as 
extracurricular school activities, dance expenses, orthodontic 
expenses, prescriptions, and glasses (Plaintiff's Exhibit 132).n 
Judge Dever concluded that an award of $400 would ''roughly 
equalize" the position of the parties. In the order drafted by the 
court, Judge Dever stated, 
Child support and the plaintiff's income (second job 
included) combined are $2769. Defendant's income minus 
child support is $3579. Alimony in the amount of $400 
would be appropriate in that it roughly equalizes the 
parties and allows the plaintiff the necessary sum to 
continue in the lifestyle the parties shared during the 
marriage. The alimony is to continue for nineteen years 
subject to the standard terms and conditions. 
(1626-27). 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law state, 
Plaintiff has living expenses of $2,806 and a total gross 
income (including wages from primary occupation, second 
job and child support) of $2,769. Defendant's income 
less child support is $3,579. An alimony award of $400 
would roughly equalize the respective incomes of the 
parties and allows Plaintiff sufficient funds to continue 
the lifestyle the parties shared during the marriage. 
(1721) . 
Under the court's orders, Janna Griffith is expected to work 
11
 Expenses for children are not normally to be considered 
in awarding alimony, e.g. Chambers v. Chambers 840 P.2d 841, 843 
n.l (Utah 1992). In the instant case, Judge Dever credited child 
support paid to Janna as income, and decreased David's income by 
the amount of child support he was paying, and considered the 
children's expenses along with Janna's in reaching the alimony 
award. 
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two jobs and is left with $363 a month in discretionary income to 
provide for all expenses disallowed by the trial court, and any 
emergencies and unplanned-for expenses for herself and her four 
children.12 Meanwhile, David Griffith will continue to work in his 
comfortable position at C&G, and is left with a minimum of $3,179 
a month, in addition to whatever benefits the family business may 
offer, to provide only for himself. 
Janna's ability to earn sufficient funds to achieve her 
marital standard of living is limited by her limited education, 
consisting of high school and some bank teller classes, by her 
relatively unskilled and low-paying employment experience as a bank 
teller and runner for C&G, by her age of 41, and by her time 
commitments to her four children (2160-66, 2084). 
David's ability to support Janna at the requisite level is 
excellent, given his comfortable position and bright future with 
C&G, discussed in the statement of facts. 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
The purpose of alimony is to prevent the spouse receiving 
alimony from becoming a public charge, and to maintain her marital 
standard of living after the divorce, to the degree possible. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). In setting 
the amount of alimony, the court should have considered three 
12
 As is discussed below, the court refused to order David 
Griffith to pay any of Mr. Allred's attorney's fees totaling over 
$70,000. 
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factors: "The financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming 
support, the ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income 
for him or herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide the support." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 
1986). See also Utah Code Ann, §30-3-5. Alimony is not limited 
to providing for most basic needs, provided that the paying spouse 
can afford to pay more. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In the instant case, Judge Dever did not articulate a tri-
partite analysis of the alimony question, as he should have under 
Paffel. Rather, as noted above, he articulated and then widely 
missed his goal of "roughly" equalizing Janna's and David's 
positions. 
Consideration of the proper factors leads to the conclusion 
that the alimony award was grossly inadequate. 
At trial, Janna Griffith established that her monthly needs, 
in order to maintain the marital standard of living, required 
income of $4155.44 (Plaintiff's exhibit 132). David testified that 
he had no specific information, but thought that Janna's estimates 
of family cost of living were significantly inflated (2010). The 
comptroller for C&G testified that he could not account for all of 
Janna's claimed expenses in reviewing her financial records, but 
conceded that the records were incomplete, and did not account for 
cash transactions (2792-2803, 2761-68). 
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While Judge Dever found that Janna failed to establish her 
claimed needs by a preponderance of the evidence, and chose to set 
the sum of $2,806 as the value of her needs, the trial court's 
findings regarding her needs are not attributed or attributable to 
any source of evidence in the record, and are so vague and 
confused, see supra at 19, 20, 21 as to render futile a traditional 
effort to marshal the evidence in support of the findings.13 
Judge Dever did not address Janna's ability to achieve her 
historical standard of living on her own, which ability is limited 
by virtue of her limited education and job experience and earning 
capacity, and by her age and time commitments to her children. 
Judge Dever did not address Mr. Griffith's substantial ability 
to pay to support Janna's standard of living. Nor did he 
In the often cited opinion, Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 
P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991), this Court explained the 
importance of trial courts' making adequate findings of fact, and 
stated that adequate findings must "embody sufficient detail and 
include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon 
which they are grounded," in order to facilitate appellate 
review. Id. at 477. This Court further explained that the 
traditional marshaling requirement, wherein an appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of any finding subject to 
challenge on appeal, does not apply if the findings of fact are 
insufficiently detailed to disclose their evidentiary basis. Id. 
at 477. The Court concluded, 
In other words, the way to attack findings which appear 
to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is 
to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate 
the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. 
But where the findings are not of that caliber, 
appellant need not go through a futile marshaling 
exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal 
insufficiency of the court's findings as framed. 
Id. at 477-478. See also Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52. 
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acknowledge that when a party such as Mr. Griffith is in a position 
to pay, the alimony award should attetnpt to maintain the station in 
life to which the other spouse is accustomed. See e.g. Howell, 
supra. 
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court for 
the entry of adequate findings, and for recalculation and 
augmentation of the alimony award, or should itself enter an 
appropriate alimony award in the amount requested by Janna 
Griffith.14 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DISTRIBUTING THE MARITAL ASSETS. 
A. RELEVANT FACTS 
During the course of the marriage, the parties amassed several 
retirement accounts. Janna Griffith had an I.R.A. worth $2,559, a 
4-501 account worth $2,891, and a pension worth $2,513, while David 
had an I.R.A. worth $5,975 and a retirement profit sharing account 
at C&G worth well over $85, 264 (1630-1632). The present value of 
the C&G profit sharing plan could not be determined at the time of 
trial, because C&G operates on a fiscal year, rather than a 
calendar year, and thus the annual valuation of the plan is delayed 
See e.g. Woodward: Rule 52, supra. Compare Martinez v. 
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 75 (Utah App. 1988)(increasing alimony 
award from $400 to $750, in light of family's standard of 
living, wife's poor prospects for achieving that standard on her 
own, and husband's ability to pay), rev'd on other grounds, 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
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substantially (2647, Plaintiff's exhibit 12, page 15). While Mr. 
Allred argued that the Court should enter an order dividing the 
retirement plans on the basis of the upcoming valuation of the C&G 
profit sharing plan, in order to ascertain the present value and 
properly divide the C&G account (2645-47), the court never 
ascertained the present value of the C&G account. 
Evidence at trial established that the C&G profit sharing plan 
contemplated the entry of qualified domestic relations orders 
(2460). 
Despite Janna Griffith's argument that the retirement accounts 
should be divided nearly equally because of the unique tax and 
investment benefits that they provided (2645-1649), Judge Dever 
awarded each party their own accounts, leaving the entire C&G 
account to David (1630-31). 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
Retirement accounts are recognized as marital assets, and are 
subject to distribution along with all other marital property, to 
the extent that rights to the accounts accrued during the marriage. 
See e.g. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982).15 
15
 In Woodward, supra, the court indicated that trial 
courts may award retirement accounts solely to the employee 
spouses, in limited circumstances. The court explained, 
"Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests 
are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and 
hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible. This 
goal may be best accomplished, if a present value of 
the pension plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
26 
Since Woodward, this Court has recognized that there is a 
legal presumption that each marital asset is to be divided equally 
between divorcing spouses, that in order to deviate from this 
presumption, there must be unusual circumstances, and that the 
trial court must make adequate findings to justify any deviation.16 
In the instant case, Judge Dever made no findings to justify 
his failure to divide the retirement accounts evenly, and there 
appear to be no unusual circumstances in this case that would 
justify such a deviation. This trial court's failure to make 
appropriate findings thus calls for reversal under Hall. 
The trial court's errors in failing to divide the retirement 
accounts evenly is even more clear in light of the Woodward 
analysis. As noted above, the trial court never determined a 
present value for the C&G account, or took the effects of C&G's 
fiscal year accounting methods into account. The trial court did 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all appropriate 
considerations, including the length of time the 
pensioner must survive to enjoy its benefits, to be 
satisfied out of other assets leaving all pension 
benefits to the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets for 
equitable distribution are inadequate or lacking 
altogether, or where no present value can be 
established and the parties are unable to reach 
agreement, resort must be had to a form of deferred 
distribution based upon fixed percentages." 
Id. at 433, quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (N.J. 
Super. 1981). 
16
 See e.g. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 
1993)(discussing inheritance)(citations omitted). 
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not make any findings concerning the time period over which David 
Griffith would have to survive in order to 'obtain the benefits of 
the plan, or note any other adjustments to be made. He simply took 
the latest (but not current) evaluation of the C&G account, and 
awarded the entirety of the account to David. 
While it appears that Judge Dever attempted to award other 
marital assets to Janna to compensate for her not receiving her 
share of the C&G retirement account, a cursory review of the 
property granted to Janna demonstrates that none of the other 
assets awarded her had a qualitative value approaching the large 
account at C&G, which carried with it such significant tax and 
investment advantages. (See 1714-17, 1706-1707). 
Moreover, the trial court's assessment of marital assets was 
clearly erroneous, to the detriment of Janna. For instance, the 
trial court found that nearly $7,500 in savings bonds were the 
separate property of David Griffith (1726-27). The bonds were 
given to David and Janna at Christmas time by David's grandmother, 
Alene Griffith, who handed the bonds to Janna and told them both, 
"Merry Christmas." (2157-58). Despite David's agreement 
concerning Janna's account of how the gifts were given to him and 
her, he maintained, and Judge Dever apparently agreed, that the 
bonds were his separate property on the sole basis that they had 
David's name on them, and not Janna's (2044-45). Alene Griffith 
was never called to challenge her intention in giving the bonds to 
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both David and Janna. 
Judge Dever's finding on this point was legally erroneous. 
See Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980).17 While the 
majority of the bonds were in David's name, the evidence 
established Aline Griffith's intent to make a joint gift to David 
and Janna with the bonds. In these circumstances, the bonds should 
not have been considered David's separate property. See id. See 
also Smith v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1987) (trial court 
erred in excluding evidence regarding grantor's intent on theory 
that title of property was binding on question of whether property 
was a marital or separate asset). 
IV. 
JANNA GRIFFITH SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. RELEVANT FACTS 
At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Allred submitted a 
detailed claim for outstanding attorney fees in the amount of 
$75,533.61 (1502-1523), and Mr. McDonald submitted a detailed claim 
for outstanding attorney fees totaling $47,366.50, and costs 
totaling $3,123.96 (1524-1582). Mr. McDonald claimed that a 
The Jackson Court explained, 
The state of title to marital property prior to a 
divorce decree is not necessarily binding on the trial 
court in its distribution of such property pursuant to 
such decree. The trial court is empowered to make such 
distributions as are just and equitable, and may 
compel such conveyances as are necessary to that end. 
Id. at 340. 
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proper prosecution and defense of the case should have cost a 
maximum of $20,000, and attributed the fees generated in excess of 
this amount to Mr. Allred's allegedly meritless litigation 
throughout the case (1574-75) . 
The financial evidence before the court clearly established 
Janna Griffith's need for assistance in paying her attorney's fees, 
and David Griffith's ability to pay. See e.g. discussion of 
relevant facts in Point II of this brief, supra at pages 19 through 
25. 
Judge Dever did not award attorney fees to either party.18 
In Judge Dever's original order, he stated summarily, 
The attorney's fees generated by this case are not 
reasonable. Both parties are gainfully employed, the 
division of property and income is roughly equal and 
therefore both sides are to assume their own fees, with 
the exception of those fees previously awarded to the 
defendant and the fees incurred by the defendant in 
opposing the motion to disqualify his counsel. 
(1625-26). 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by Mr. 
McDonald state, 
This is a divorce involving two salaried individuals 
with a modest marital estate and no dispute as to 
custody. The Court finds that the attorneys' fees 
claimed for the motions and memoranda filed by the 
Plaintiff are unreasonable. 
Inasmuch as both parties are gainfully employed, and 
the division of property and income is roughly equal 
between the parties, and subject to the provisions of 
paragraphs 41 and 42-44 [involving fees from Judge 
Rokich's recusal and the motion to disqualify Mr„ 
McDonald], each party shall be solely responsible for 
the payment of their own costs and attorneys fees. 
(1719) . 
The final decree drafted by Mr. McDonald states, 
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B. RELEVANT LAW 
In ruling on a motion for attorney fees in divorce 
proceedings, a trial court should consider the financial need of 
the requesting spouse, the reasonableness of the fees, and the 
other spouse's ability to pay.19 The reasonableness of the fees 
is determined by considering such factors as 
"the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of 
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the result attained, 
and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved." 
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 735, 741 (Utah App. 1992) (citations 
omitted) . 
When a trial court chooses to reduce requested fees sua 
sponte, the court must make findings to demonstrate that the 
The Court concludes that the costs and attorneys fees 
claimed by Plaintiff's attorney in representing 
Plaintiff in this action are unreasonable in light of 
the complexity (or lack thereof) to the issues involved 
in this litigation, the size of the marital estate, and 
the remedies sought by many of the motions filed by 
Plaintiff in light of the legal expense necessary to 
prepare said motions and supporting memoranda. 
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 30 and 31, each 
party shall be solely responsible for the payment of 
their respective costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
the prosecution and defense of this action. 
(1710) . 
19
 See e.g. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah 
App. 1989); Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992); 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. 
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requested fees are not reasonable under the foregoing standards.20 
As noted above, in the instant matter, Judge Dever did not 
consider either party's ability to pay (other than noting that both 
parties are salaried employees), but flatly ruled that the fees 
involved in Mr. Allred's motions and memoranda were unreasonable. 
He did not articulate any factual or evidentiary basis for his 
conclusion that the fees were unreasonable, or address the 
reasonableness of the fees to Janna Griffith which stemmed from Mr. 
Allred's work, aside from that involved in the motions and 
memoranda. 
In altering the final documents to reflect unreasonableness 
solely on the part of Mr. Allred, where the original order 
indicated that both parties' fees were unreasonable, and in 
creating a reasonableness rationale in support of this conclusion 
out of whole cloth, and without any guidance from the trial court, 
Mr. McDonald created final documents that did not reflect the trial 
court's original intent.21 
Moreover, nothing in the findings and conclusions or final 
decree addresses the needs of Janna Griffith in paying her attorney 
20
 See Muir.; Finlavson v. Finlavson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 
(Utah App. 1994). 
21
 See e.g. Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, 
Inc.f 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., 
concurring)(warning of hazards of relying on counsel to draft 
findings and conclusions which do not reflect intent of court); 
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 
1990)(citing Justice Zimmerman's opinion in Automatic Control 
with approval). 
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fees, or David's ability to pay them. 
Because the trial court's findings were legally inadequate, 
this Court should remand to the trial court for consideration of 
and entry of findings on the proper criteria.22 
Alternatively, this Court should simply review the affidavit 
of Mr. Allred in support of his fees (in the addendum to this 
brief) , in light of the overall record of this case, and determine 
that the trial court's refusal to award the requested fees was an 
abuse of discretion warranting a full award of attorney fees to 
Janna Griffith. (See 1502-23). 
V. 
JUDGE ROKICH'S POST-RECUSAL ORDERS 
WERE ILLEGAL. 
A. RELEVANT FACTS 
Prior to trial, Mr. McDonald submitted a trial memorandum 
characterizing David Griffith's side job income as "the primary 
dispute" in the divorce (926) . The mem&randum explained that the 
leukemia of David's brother, Paul Griffith, and Paul's attendant 
treatment, in conjunction with David's father's increasing 
responsibilities as a Tooele County Commissioner, required David 
Griffith to assume more responsibility and stress at C&G, 
effectively precluding David from continuing to do the side jobs 
(924-925). In memoranda filed prior to trial, Janna Griffith 
22
 See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52; Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991), quoted supra at 
page *; Mauahan; and Muir. 
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argued that David's obligation to perform the side jobs was not 
diminished by his brother's illness or by his father's political 
activities, inasmuch as David's legal duty was to support his wife 
and children (e.g. 650-658). 
On March 14, 1996, trial began before Judge Rokich. Prior to 
Mr. Allred' s opening statement, Judge Rokich indicated that he had 
read the trial memorandum (which discussed Paul Griffith's illness 
and treatment and its effect on David Griffith's ability to 
continue with side jobs) (924-25, 1965). 
At the conclusion of Mr. Allred's opening statement, Judge 
Rokich interjected, explaining that about a week prior to trial, 
Judge Rokich had received a telephone call from Paul Griffith, 
regarding his treatment for the leukemia, because the judge was 
considering undergoing the same treatment and the judge's doctor 
wanted the judge to talk to Paul Griffith. Mr. Allred said he had 
no problem with that, asked the judge some questions about the 
conversation, and thanked the judge. The judge did not ask if 
there were any objections, or ask the parties if they agreed to his 
continued service on the case. (1951-1953). 
The trial proceeded for the first day, in which the attorneys 
examined five witnesses (1763-1951). 
At the outset of the second day of trial, Mr. Allred addressed 
Judge Rokich, seeking additional details concerning how the judge 
came in contact with the witness Paul Griffith, to establish 
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whether there had been any improper effort to influence the judge. 
Mr. Allred explained that it was Janna's legal position that Paul 
Griffith's illness and treatment were irrelevant, and did not 
diminish David's responsibilities to support his wife and children. 
Mr. Allred indicated that if Judge Rokich would rule that the 
evidence was irrelevant, any concerns about the pre-trial contact 
of Judge Rokich by the witness would effectively be moot. 
During the course of the discussion, Judge Rokich became 
incensed. He indicated that it would be to Mr. Allred's benefit 
for the Judge to have personal understanding of Paul Griffith's 
condition and treatment. Judge Rokich interpreted the questions 
regarding the contact as an affront to his own integrity and 
recused himself from the case, stating that such recusal was a 
necessary result of Mr. Allred's asking the questions. After he 
recused himself, he indicated that he was considering assessing 
attorneys fees against Mr. Allred for the day of trial that 
transpired before the court recused himself. (1756-1762) . 
On March 21, 1996, Mr. McDonald moved for costs and attorneys 
fees stemming from the judge's recusal (968-980). Mr. Allred filed 
his opposition on March 26, 1996 (983-1002). 
On May 6, 1996, Judge Rokich entered a signed minute entry 
ordering Mr. Allred and Janna Griffith to pay $4,542.00 in 
attorneys fees, reasoning that Mr. Allred had manipulated the court 
into recusing himself, and had forced the recusal by suggesting 
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that the court could have been improperly influenced by the 
telephone call from Paul Griffith. (1008-1009). 
On May 16, 1996, Mr. Allred moved for the vacation of the 
minute entry and for a hearing before Judge Dever, arguing that 
Judge Rokich had no authority to act in the case after he had 
recus.ed himself (1010-1027) . Mr. Allred also opposed a proposed 
order, judgment and findings and conclusions drafted by Mr. 
McDonald (1042-1059), and moved to stay enforcement of the 
judgment, and for relief from the judgment (1066-1143). 
On May 29, 1996, Judge Rokich entered a judgment against Janna 
Griffith and J. Franklin Allred in the amount of $4,542 (1175-76). 
He also signed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
incorporating the minute entry (1178-1181). He also signed an 
order of recusal (1183-1186). Judge Rokich also submitted an 
additional minute entry on May 30, 1996, seeking to rebut documents 
filed by Mr. Allred, and Mr. Allred and Mr. McDonald filed 
subsequent affidavits seeking to establish what occurred after the 
judge recused himself (1187-1188, 1198-1207, 1302-1306). 
Judge Dever did not vacate the orders of Judge Rokich, but in 
the supplemental divorce decree, ordered Mr. Allred and Mrs. 
Griffith to pay the attorney fees ordered by Judge Rokich, and 
incorporated the minute entries and orders of Judge Rokich by 
reference in the supplemental divorce decree (1738-1739). 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
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The numerous errors of law which occurred are addressed herein 
in the order in which they arose. 
1. Judge Rokich violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Judge Rokich's contact with a witness prior to trial, during 
which the judge and the witness discussed the effects of Paul 
Griffith's illness, facts that were in issue in this case, 
provided a basis for Judge Rokich's disqualification under 
subsection E of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, 
Judge Rokich was correct in revealing the basis for 
disqualification. See id. 
Under subsection F of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Judge Rokich should have disclosed any basis for his 
disqualification to the attorneys and parties, and left them to 
consider outside his presence whether they wished to proceed with 
him presiding, despite the basis for disqualification. Assuming 
that the parties and attorneys agreed to his continuing to preside, 
he should then have made an independent decision as to his 
willingness to preside over the case, and made a record of the 
parties' and attorneys' agreement permitting him to continue 
presiding. 
Thus, it was in failing to leave the courtroom while the 
parties and attorneys discussed the issue, and in failing to obtain 
a record of the consent of all attorneys and parties to Judge 
Rokich's presiding over the case despite the basis for his 
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disqualification, that Judge Rokich violated Canon 3 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
2. Judge Rokich misunderstood the law in concluding that Mr. 
Allred's questions forced the judge to recuse himself. 
In concluding that Judge Rokich's recusal was required by Mr. 
Allred's questioning whether the judge might have been improperly 
influenced, Judge Rokich misunderstood the relevant law. 
As is set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63, a party's 
mere inquiry into whether a judge should be recused does not 
automatically result in recusal.23 Under the rule, a party must 
file an affidavit of prejudice and certificate of good faith in 
order to initiate recusal proceedings. It is then incumbent on the 
trial judge to assess the legal adequacy of an affidavit of 
prejudice, and then either recuse himself from the case, or 
immediately refer the matter to another judge for review of the 
legal adequacy of the grounds for recusal. Barnard at 682. 
3. Judge Rokich should not have participated further in the case 
after recusing himself. 
Once Judge Rokich recused himself from the case, he should 
have taken no further action, but should have immediately 
23
 See e.g. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 683 (Utah 
1994)(in declining motion to require judge to recuse himself in 
each case in which Mr. Barnard filed an affidavit of prejudice, 
this Court stated, "A blanket, prospective direction of automatic 
recusal is beyond the scope of Rule 63(b)."). 
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relinquished the entire case to a qualified judge.24 
There* was no need for Judge Rokich to even enter a findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on the recusal.25 
Judge Rokich's orders signed after he recused himself were 
void and violated the parties' rights to due process of law, 
because he had no authority to make them.26 
4. There was no legal basis for assessing attorney fees, assuming 
that Judge Rokich could enter such an order after he had recused 
himself. 
"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by 
statute or by contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988). The statute governing the award of attorney 
See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(1)("A judge 
shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those 
in which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or 
transfer to another court occurs."). Cf. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 63(b)("if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified 
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called 
in to try the case or determine the matter in question."); 
Barnard, 882 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah App. 1994) (court faced with 
recusal motion must either grant the motion and transfer the 
case, or refer the matter to another judge, and may not perform 
even ministerial functions after the recusal issue is raised). 
25
 See State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 762-763 (Utah 
1984)(court denying recusal under 63B need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law). 
26
 See Anderson v. Anderson, 368 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1962)(judgment entered by court who failed to comply with 63(b) 
was ineffective against the person who filed the affidavit of 
prejudice under the rule); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 
P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App. 1991) (judgment is void if judge was 
incompetent to render judgment); Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 
314, 317 (Utah 1945)(fundamental tenet of due process of law is 
lawful authority of person or body who adjudicates). 
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fees in civil cases is Utah Code Ann.§78-27-56, which is copied in 
the addendum. 
In the context of this case, there is no basis for an award of 
attorney fees under the statute, because there was no prevailing 
party when Judge Rokich simply recused himself, and did not act on 
the motion of the defendant.27 
Moreover, there was no cause of action or defense involved in 
Judge Rokich's recusing himself.28 
Assuming arguendo that it were proper to consider awarding 
fees under section 78-27-56 where there is no prevailing party or 
cause of action or defense at issue, application of the law 
interpreting that statute demonstrates that attorney fees should 
not be awarded here. "For a prevailing party in a civil action to 
be awarded attorney fees under Sec. 78-27-56, a court must find 
that (1) the action, or in this case the defense, is without merit 
and (2) the defense was asserted in bad faith." Broadwater v. Old 
Republican Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1993). 
A trial court awarding fees under this rule is required to 
make specific findings as to each element, so that a reviewing 
27
 See. Hermes v. Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 
(Utah Appc 1991) (finding no attorney fees awardable under 78-27-
56, because Park was not the prevailing party). 
28
 CjL. e.g. State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 
1984)(affidavit of prejudice under 63(b) is not properly 
characterized as an action for purposes of rules 3 or 63(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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court can determine the propriety of the award.29 In the instant 
matter, Judge Rokich did indicate that Mr. Allred had acted in bad 
faith, but did not indicate that Allred's actions were meritless. 
This Court need not remand for more specific findings, however, for 
the record is sufficient for this Court to determine that Allred's 
actions were meritorious.30 
"A defense lacks merit when it is ^frivolous' or *of little 
weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact." id. Mr. 
Allred's inquiry into the circumstances of the contact between the 
judge and Paul Griffith was meritorious. The judge's contact with 
Paul Griffith resulted in the court's receipt of evidence that was 
key to the defendant's position on what the defendant himself 
characterized as the most hotly contested issue in the divorce — 
David Griffith's side job income. Particularly given the court's 
personal illness and upcoming treatment, and the possibility that 
the court would feel sympathy with Paul Griffith, it was important 
for Mr. Allred to determine the exact circumstances of the contact 
between the witness and the judge, and the potential impact of the 
contact. Because there was merit to Mr. Allred's inquiry, no fees 
were awardable under Broadwater. 
29
 See e.g. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 
1061, 1068 (Utah 1991). 
30
 Cf. Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 
534 (Utah 1993)(reversing attorney fee award, in spite of absence 
of proper findings by trial court, because record did not prove 
meritless action). 
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For purposes of argument, taking the analysis to its final 
step, confirms that there was no bad faith to justify the award of 
attorney fees. Under 78-27-56, "[t]o establish bad faith, one or 
more of the following must be lacking: Ml) An honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no intent to, or knowledge 
of the fact that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, 
delay or defraud others.'" Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 
(Utah 1993)(footnote and citations omitted). 
There is no evidence of bad faith in Mr. Allred's inquiry of 
Judge Rokich's contact by Paul Griffith. There is no evidence that 
Mr. Allred acted with a belief that his actions were improper, or 
with the intent to take advantage of others, or with intent or 
knowledge that his actions would hinder, delay or defraud anyone. 
While it obviously would have been preferable for Mr. Allred to 
have realized the need for further inquiry on the first day of 
trial, particularly given the judge's failure to adjourn the case 
and conduct a proper inquiry pursuant to Canon 3, Allred's delay 
does not rise to the level of bad faith.31 
In short, there was no factual or lawful basis for an award of 
attorney fees under Utah law. 
31
 Compare Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 1983) 
(trial court erred in finding a lack of good faith stemming from 
plaintiff's failure to research issue and determine its meritless 
nature prior to trial). 
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5. Judge Dever should have vacated Judge Rokich's orders. 
As noted above, because Judge Rokich had no lawful authority 
to act further in the case after he recused himself, his orders 
were void. Nonetheless, Judge Dever refused to vacate the orders, 
and adopted them in the supplemental decree of divorce. 
While the "law of the case" doctrine generally indicates that 
co-equal district court judge may not overrule one another on 
identical issues decided in the same case, under the doctrine, 
courts have the authority to alter non-final orders, and orders 
that are incorrect. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 
1311 (Utah App. 1994). Because Judge Rokich had recused himself 
before he uttered any orders regarding attorney fees, Judge Rokich 
was not acting with authority co-equal to Judge Dever's when Judge 
Rokich entered the attorney's fee orders. See e.g. Canon 3(B)(1), 
supra. Moreover, because Judge Rokich's entire analysis was 
premised on the incorrect idea that Mr. Allred's inquiry 
automatically forced the judge to recuse himself, see e.g. Barnard, 
supra, the orders were legally incorrect. 
Judge Dever had full authority to vacate the orders of Judge 
Rokich, and should have done so. 
VI. 
JANNA GRIFFITH'S MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY ROBERT MCDONALD 
DID NOT JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. RELEVANT FACTS 
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Judge Dever ordered Mr. Allred, and Janna Griffith to pay to 
Mr. McDonald, stemming from Mrs. Griffith's unsuccessful motion to 
disqualify Mr. McDonald from the case. Judge Dever then assessed 
$2,588.50 in attorney fees, to be paid by Janna Griffith and Mr. 
Allred (1718). The facts and procedural history pertinent to the 
disqualification issue follow. 
On December 15, 1995, Mr. McDonald submitted a motion to 
compel and supporting documents indicating an agreement between the 
parties to voluntarily produce all financial information (287-346). 
On December 22, 1995, Mr. Allred filed a response in 
opposition and supporting documents, disclaiming any such broad 
agreement to produce information (356-466).32 
On January 5, 1996, Mr. Allred moved to disqualify Mr. 
McDonald (617-635). 
With the motion to disqualify, he submitted an affidavit from 
Janna Griffith indicating that in November of 1994, David Griffith 
had called her and indicated that he had hired an attorney who knew 
Mr. Allred very well, and had implied that his attorney had some 
influence over Mr. Allred. Upon learning that David Griffith had 
retained Mr. McDonald, Mr. Allred explained to Janna Griffith that 
At a later hearing, in discussing discovery matters, 
Mr. McDonald retreated from his position that Allred had agreed 
to provide all documents voluntarily (2352-2364) . 
Judge Dever found that no such agreement existing in denying 
McDonald's motion to compel based on "the claimed oral agreement 
to produce any and all documents." (836-837). 
44 
McDonald had represented Allred in a domestic case in 1980 and 
1981. Mr. Allred told her that as long as Mr. McDonald behaved 
ethically, there should be no problem. 
Her affidavit indicated that on September 14 of 1995, Mr. 
Allred reported to her that Mr. Griffith's father had made threats 
against Mrs. Griffith, and inquired about McDonald's prior 
representation of Mr. Allred. 
Her affidavit indicated finally that she interpreted 
McDonald's false claim that Allred had agreed to voluntarily 
produce all her financial information as implying McDonald's 
expectation of improper influence over Allred as a result of 
information McDonald had about Allred from previously representing 
Allred. She therefore asked Mr. Allred to make efforts to 
disqualify Mr. McDonald from representing Mr. Griffith. (617-622) . 
Mr. Allred's affidavit in support of the motion to disqualify 
explained that as a result of McDonald's prior representation of 
Allred, McDonald was privy to Mr. Allred's litigation tactics in 
divorce proceedings, and a good deal of highly personal information 
about Mr. Allred, and could damage Allred substantially should he 
reveal any such information. The Allred affidavit indicated that 
on September 5, 1995, David Griffith's father, Gary Griffith, 
called Allred, and among other things, asked whether McDonald's 
prior representation of Allred was impeding a settlement in the 
Griffith case. The Allred affidavit indicated that Mr. McDonald 
45 
grossly expanded the scope of Allred's agreement to produce certain 
documents in discovery, and thereby made it appear that Allred was 
not being diligent in representing Janna's interests. The Allred 
affidavit noted that in McDonald's affidavit in support of the 
motion to compel, in conjunction with the fabricated discovery 
stipulation, McDonald referred to his reliance on a "long 
association" with Mr. Allred, despite the fact that they had had no 
social or professional contact since 1981. Allred concluded that 
the fabricated stipulation, the "long association" 
mischaracterization in the affidavit alleging the fabricated 
stipulation, and David and Gary Griffith's statements about 
McDonald's familiarity with Mr. Allred, indicated that McDonald 
could no longer serve as counsel for David Griffith without 
undermining Janna Griffith's confidence in Allred and/or violating 
Allred's attorney-client privilege with McDonald. (623-632). 
Allred submitted a lengthy memorandum of law supporting the 
motion to disqualify (635-647). The memorandum, signed by both Mr. 
Allred, and co-counsel, Edward K. Brass, relied on numerous rules 
of professional conduct, Utah Rule of Evidence 504, and numerous 
cases from this Court, the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Federal 
District Court, and the Tenth Circuit (635-647). 
On January 19, 1996, McDonald submitted a memorandum in 
opposition disqualification, arguing that the vintage of his prior 
representation of Allred resulted in McDonald's having no memory of 
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any sensitive information, and arguing that the Griffith and Allred 
cases were factually unrelated (700-706). In his supporting 
affidavit, Mr. McDonald alleged that he had no record or 
recollection of details concerning Mr. Allred's divorce case, and 
that he had not violated Mr. Allred's confidences. He argued that 
inasmuch as he was the attorney in the Allred divorce, Allred stood 
to benefit from McDonald's strategies, and not vice versa (707-
711) . 
Mr. McDonald submitted an affidavit from Gary Griffith 
indicating that he had not received improper information regarding 
Allred from McDonald (712-716). 
Mr. McDonald submitted an affidavit from David Griffith 
indicating that Griffith had informed him of previously 
representing Allred, and that David Griffith had not implied in his 
telephone conversation with Janna Griffith that McDonald held sway 
over Allred as a result of his prior representation (720-717). 
On January 26, 1996, Mr. Allred submitted a reply memorandum 
in support of disqualification (760-780). 
Allred submitted an affidavit from Janna Griffith indicating 
that she did not anticipate the problems that would flow from 
McDonald's prior representation of Allred, but upon becoming aware, 
immediately sought his removal from the case (760-762). 
An affidavit from Richard MacDougal indicated that Allred and 
MacDougal were the strategists in the Allred divorce, and that 
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McDonald simply examined witnesses in accordance with the strategy 
set forth by Allred and McDougal (763-766). 
Mr. Allred filed an additional affidavit alleging that the 
motion to disqualify was filed in good faith, and immediately upon 
Allred's realization that the conflicts stemming from McDonald's 
prior representation were intolerable (767-769). 
On January 29, 1996, Judge Dever heard and denied the motion 
to disqualify Mr. McDonald indicating that he did not "see from 
the affidavits that there was any hint of any type of special 
arrangement between Mr. Allred and Mr. McDonald that was there and 
came as a result of any type of control that Mr. McDonald had over 
Mr. Allred." (784; 2340-2352). 
On March 12, 1996, Judge Dever entered the order denying the 
motion to disqualify, reserving the issue of attorney fees pursuant 
to rule 11 until a hearing on the motion for sanctions (885-887). 
On January 24, 1996, Mr. McDonald submitted a motion for in 
Rule 11 sanctions stemming from the motion to disqualify McDonald, 
seeking a judgment against J. Franklin Allred and Edward K. Brass 
in the amount of $2,588.50 (742-751). 
On February 2, 1996, Mr. Allred submitted a response to the 
motion for sanctions (793-804). He submitted affidavits of himself 
and Mr. Brass, demonstrating that the disqualification issue had 
been fully investigated on the facts and the law, and that several 
attorneys who had been consulted concurred in the propriety of 
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moving to disqualify McDonald (793-804). 
Judge Dever never held hearing on the specific issue of rule 
11 sanctions on the motion to disqualify, as he previously had 
indicated he would in the order denying the motion to disqualify 
(885).33 In the supplemental decree of divorce, Judge Dever 
ordered Mr. Allred and Mrs. Griffith to pay $2,588.50 (742-751). 
In the original order drafted by the court, Judge Dever stated, 
The attorney's fees generated by this case are not 
reasonable. Both parties are gainfully employed, the 
division of property and income is roughly equal and 
therefore both sides are to assume their own fees, with 
the exception of those fees previously awarded to the 
defendant and the fees incurred by the defendant in 
opposing the motion to disqualify his counsel. 
(1624-25). The findings of fact drafted by defense counsel and 
signed by the court state, 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney 
filed on January 4, 1996, was not well grounded in fact 
or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, 
and was filed for an improper purpose to harass Defendant 
and cause unnecessary delay and needless increase in the 
costs of litigation. 
(1719). 
The conclusions of law drafted by defense counsel and signed 
by the court stated, 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney 
filed on January 4, 1996, was without merit. The legal 
33
 It appears that because the parties were given the 
opportunity to brief the issue fully in writing, due process of 
law did not require a hearing. See Poulsen v. Frear, 1997 Utah 
App. LEXIS 113 at 12 (Case No. 960484-CA, filed October 8, 1997) . 
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services performed by Defendant's attorney in opposing 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney 
were necessary and the time devoted to each service was 
reasonable. The Court further concludes that the hourly 
rate charged for said legal services was fair and 
reasonable. 
(1708-09). 
It is critical to note that the original conclusion of law 
drafted by defense counsel included language indicating that the 
filing of the motion to disqualify violated rule 11, but Judge 
Dever ordered this language replaced with the language indicating 
simply that the motion was without merit (1700). 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by defense 
counsel and signed by the court parroted the portion of rule 11 (in 
the addendum to this brief) referring to whether the motion was 
well grounded in fact or law, but failed to address the key issue 
— the reasonableness of Mr. Allred's inquiry in assessing the 
legal and factual accuracy of the motion.34 
A finding that the motion was not well grounded in fact or law 
does not justify sanctions under Rule 11, in the absence of any 
analysis of the reasonableness of the inquiry of counsel. See 
The findings of fact stated, 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney 
filed on January 4, 1996, was not well grounded in fact 
or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law, and was filed for an improper purpose to harass 
Defendant and cause unnecessary delay and needless 
increase in the costs of litigation. 
(1719). 
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Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992). 
Judge Dever did not address in any ruling or document the 
reasonableness of Mr. Allred's inquiry, or acknowledge the 
affidavits of Mr. Allred and Mr. Brass detailing the exhaustive 
factual and legal research done prior to the filing of the motion, 
and specifying several attorneys Mr. Allred consulted about filing 
the motion prior to doing so (793-804). Compare Barnard v. Utah 
State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993).35 
Judge Dever's orders denying the motion to disqualify did 
not turn on any perceived factual misrepresentations or legal 
misrepresentations or statements, but essentially disagreed with 
the conclusions that Mr. Allred and Janna Griffith drew from the 
In Barnard, the court reversed the trial court's award 
of rule 11 sanctions, stating, 
As we noted in Sutliff, rule 11 does not require 
perfect research but rather research that it 
"objectively reasonable under all the circumstances." 
Id. at 1236 (citations omitted). In other words, 
Barnard need not have reached the correct conclusion; 
he need only have made a reasonable inquiry. The trial 
court's order fails to acknowledge that Barnard 
submitted affidavits from eight attorneys indicating 
that they could find no law precluding a suit of this 
kind from being filed in district court. In addition, 
the order ignores Barnard's own affidavit, prepared in 
Sutliff and submitted as an exhibit in this case, 
describing his own research and his reliance on the 
fact that several district court judges had exercised 
jurisdiction over actions he had previously filed 
against the Bar. 
In light of this evidence and in light of the fact 
that Sutliff had not yet been decided, we cannot say 
that Barnard failed to make a reasonable inquiry. 
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d at 920. 
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facts (885-887).36 As the Barnard cases demonstrate, however, 
incorrect conclusions do not justify rule 11 sanctions, in the 
absence of a finding that the attorney failed to perform a 
reasonable inquiry into the merits of the motion at issue. See id. 
As in the Barnard cases, because the trial court failed to 
recognize the proof demonstrating a reasonable inquiry by counsel, 
the trial court's order for rule 11 sanctions should be reversed. 
The findings of fact drafted by counsel and signed by the 
court indicating that the motion "was filed for an improper purpose 
to harass Defendant and cause unnecessary delay and needless 
increase in the costs of litigation," parrots the language of rule 
11, and appears to have been inserted by counsel to bolster the 
trial court's ruling. Neither of the trial court's oral or written 
rulings denying the motion to disqualify intimate any improper 
purpose in filing the motion (784; 2340-2352). More importantly, 
Judge Dever ordered defense counsel to delete from the conclusions 
of law language indicating that the motion to disqualify violated 
rule 11, and ordered counsel to simply indicate that the motion was 
without merit (1700) . The language in the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law drafted by counsel thus appears to be 
inconsistent with the trial court's original and final intent, and 
Mr. Allred and Janna Griffith continue to maintain that 
the facts and the law set forth in the motion to disqualify and 
supporting documents are correct. 
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should be disregarded.37 
Assuming arguendo that the findings of fact properly reflected 
the view of the trial court, they are unsupported by the evidence. 
Any delay or expense be experienced as a result of the filing of 
the motion would have been equally prejudicial to Janna Griffith 
and Mr. Allred as it would have been to David Griffith. There is 
simply no evidence to marshal in support of the conclusion that the 
motion was filed for an improper purpose. The only evidence 
regarding the intention behind the filing of the motion is provided 
in the affidavits filed in support of the motion, and in opposition 
to the defendant's motion for sanctions, all of which demonstrate 
that the motion was filed only when Janna Griffith and Mr. Allred 
determined that the potential conflicts posed by Mr. McDonald's 
continuing to represent David Griffith were intolerable. (617-
6222, 623-632, 760-762, 767-769). 
Because there is no basis for the rule 11 sanctions, this 
Court should reverse the Court's order to pay the sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court with 
instructions to correct all of the errors addressed above, and for 
37
 See e.g. Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, 
Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J., 
concurring)(warning of hazards of relying on counsel to draft 
findings and conclusions which do not reflect intent of court); 
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 
1990)(citing Justice Zimmerman's opinion in Automatic Control 
with approval). 
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consideration of whether Janna Griffith is entitled to attorney 
fees Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. See e.g. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 
156, 162 (Utah App. 1989); and Schaumbera v. Schaumbera, 875 P.2d 
598, 604 (Utah App. 1994). 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1997. 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Attorney for Janna Griffith 
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C a n o n 1 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1106 
"May" denotes discretionary conduct or conduct that is not covered by spe« 
cific proscriptions. 
"Political organization" denotes a political party or other group, the princi-
pal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to 
political office. 
"Shall" and "shall not" impose binding obligations to respectively engage in 
or refrain from the described conduct. The failure to act in accordance with 
those obligations can result in disciplinary action. 
"Should" and "should not" are used to indicate conduct that is respectively 
encouraged or discouraged. The failure to engage in or refrain from such, 
conduct cannot result in disciplinary action. 
'Third degree of relationship" denotes the following relatives: great-grand-
parent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, 
great-grandchild, nephew or niece. 
CANON 1 
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in oui 
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforfr 
ing, and shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integ« 
rity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this 
Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. 
CANON 2 
A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE 
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES, 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit con-, 
duct that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence^  
the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige oil 
the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor shall a judge! 
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special! 
position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a] 
character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of] 
business or social life. 
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religion! 
organization, which practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race,1 
sex, religion, or national origin. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consorting with, or maintaining for disciplinary action against judge, 15J 
social relations with, criminal figure as ground A.L.R.5th 923. 
CANON 3 
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE 
IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY. 
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judge] 
take precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial dutiei] 
include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the perfoj| 
mance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge excepfl 
those in which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or tran*l 
fer to another court occurs. 
1107 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. 
A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of 
criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before 
the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, ju-
rors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an 
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of 
staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A 
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct 
manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice 
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual 
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use 
all reasonable efforts to deter, staff, court officials and others subject to 
judicial direction and control from doing so. A judge should be alert to 
avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to 
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based 
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. 
This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, reli-
gion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic 
status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a 
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to 
law. Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor con-
sider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning 
a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's 
adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge 
does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the case pending 
before the court. No communication respecting a pending or impending 
proceeding shall occur between the trial judge and an appellate court 
unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any oral 
communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of 
a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the 
court if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and 
the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportu-
nity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in 
writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their 
lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, 
and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in 
any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected 
to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic com-
ment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A 
judge should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel 
subject to judicial direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit a 
judge from making public statements in the course of official duties or 
from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. This 
Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a 
personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict 
other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding but may express 
appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the 
community. 
Canon 3 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judii 
duties, information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available 
the public. 
(12) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, or recording 
the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions 
court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may autho: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presents 
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes 
judicial administration; or $ 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of 
vestitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings. j j 
(13) A judge should prohibit taking photographs (including motion 
ture and videotape) in the courtroom and areas immediately acty 
thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except! 
still photographs of the judge and other court personnel, counsel, spe 
tors, parties and witnesses are permissible, subject to restrictions 
fied by the court and subject, in the case of parties and witnesses, to 
advance consent in writing, provided that the court shall specifically 
bid the taking of any photographs where it finds a substantial likel _ 
that such activity would jeopardize a fair hearing or trial in the matted 
issue. 
C. Administrative Responsibilities. >V$\ 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative 
sponsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional compel 
in judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and 
officials in the administration of court business. ^ 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subji 
judicial direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity^ 
diligence tha t apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias 
prejudice in the performance of their official duties.
 T\<j£ 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance 
other judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt ' 
sition of matters before them and the proper performance of their^ 
judicial responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exi 
the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and 
avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation 
appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate a[ 
priate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessii 
conduct of which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply 
information generated and communicated under the policies of the Judii 
Performance Evaluation Program. 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but 
limited to instances where: f 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a pi 
a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in aj 
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning 
proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in coni 
had practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter 
time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has beerff 
material witness concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fidui 
or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any di 
member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household,-
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an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a 
party to the proceeding, or has any other more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a per-
son: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary 
economic interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed 
about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor 
children residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of 
Canon 3E may disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the 
parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether 
to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualifica-
tion other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and 
lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not 
be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may 
participate in the proceeding. The agreemeiit shall be entered on the record, 
or if written, filed in the case file. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Interest substantially affected. whenever a judge sits on a case in which the 
Under Subdivision (E)(l)(d)(iii) of this canon, judge's relative is a partner or otherwise an 
a relative of the requisite degree of relation- equity participant in a firm that represents a 
ship has an "interest" that might be suffi- party to the case. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. 
ciently "affected by the outcome" of a case v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, ing in ex parte communication with attorney, 
Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity party, or witness, 82 A.L.R.4th 567. 
of the Judiciary: State Bar of Nevada v. Judge's previous legal association with attor-
Claiborne, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 283. ney connected to current case as warranting 
A.L.R. - Disqualification from criminal disqualification 85 A.L.R 4th 700 
proceedings of trial judge who earlier presided
 f Removal or discipline of state judge for ne-
over disposition of case of coparticipant, 72 f J** ? V U * ^ P "*'J ' 
A L R 4th 651 A.L.rl.4tn 7z7. 
' ' * ' Disciplinary action against judge on ground 
Abuse or misuse of contempt power as
 0f abusive or intemperate language or conduct 
ground for removal or discipline of judge, 76 toward attorneys, court personnel, or parties to 
A.L.R.4th 982.
 o r witnesses in actions, and the like, 89 
Disciplinary action against judge for engag- A.L.R.4th 278. 
CANON 4 
A JUDGE SHALL SO CONDUCT THE JUDGE'S EXTRA-
JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF 
CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS. 
A. Extra-judicial Activities in General. A judge shall conduct the judge's 
extra-judicial activities so that they do not: 
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a 
judge; 
(2) demean the judicial office; 
(3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties; or 
(4) exploit the judge's judicial position. 
33 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
pers. The clerk is given discretion to waive re- to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
quirement8 of the rule for parties who are not Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (c) 
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, of this rule are similar to Rule 10, F.R.C.P. 
the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
_ . . . . exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
HiXhibits. of supplying necessary material averments nor 
--Use as pleadings.
 c a n t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e exhibit be taken as part 
C l t e d
* of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
Exhibits. v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
—Use as pleadings. Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5,9, 63 to 98, Key Numbers. — Pleading *> 4, 13, 15, 
371 to 375, 418. 38 Va to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Standard. 
Amendment of complaint. Cited. 
Appeals. Amendment of complaint. 
Nature of duty imposed. Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
Reasonable inquiry. stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
Violation. lish those facts as they would have been by a 
—Question of law. verified complaint before the changes made by 
—Sanctions. this rule making verification unnecessary. 
UTAH RULES OF. CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule£52 
App. 1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr^TH) 
P.2d 131 (Utah 1989); Antxmv/Thomas? 806 
T.2d 744 (Utah Ct* App! 'i991);?Re©ve^ v.f Geiil 
tile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges'v( Gib-
son Prods. Co.; 811 P.2d 151 (Utah:1991); 
Home Sav. & Loan v.; Aetna Cas. & Surf Co.,-
^m--,«
 J r, ^ - „«„ « r t J ,™ /TT. ^ 817 P 2 d 341 (Utah CtApp. 1991); Russell y. 
g86
 ? Penrod v. Carter, 737 R2d 199 (Uta^ i Russell, 852 P.2d 997 (Utah 1993); Anderson y. 
987);:King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah x « * _ *gQQ p 2 d i o 4 5 m^u c t Ann 1995} ); State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah (XfV &***?> ? " ™ * ^ f . ( ¥ ^ . ^ , ^ " i ^ f ^ 
J)- Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. Co., 29 
2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); Henderson ' 
ever, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. 
^ 6 0 0 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, > 
P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Constr. •' 
fy; Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
Gill v/ Timnv720 P.2d,1352 (Utah 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
ftnV Jur, 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
077 et seq. ]
 y
 ,iS 
^ . S . — 88 C J.S. Trial §? 266 to 448. A j 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
ons in civil case1 as affected'by the 
er in which they are written, 10 A.L.RSd 
* r $ ^ • •*.. '. r • • r ) / 
lency of evidence, in personal injury 
m, to prove future pain and suffering and 
Warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
msd IO. . ,•>-•/,.,: ••.,' ••;'.,'V-,-H% 
ufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
n, to prove impairment of earning capac-
and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
tA.L.R.3d 88. v ., ..... -
 : .*>'-- '— 
ufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
n, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
it instructions, to jury thereon, 18 
JR.3d 170. / . ,. .,.i,iir-.i&* 
priety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
,^, of instruction to the jury as to land-
er's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
L3d 1081, , /
 v ! , 1 
e^rdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance oif agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. ! ; ' J *° frn< 
>iVerdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise,-41 A.L.R.3d 845.uoi!A 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.!iv ^ H j • ;f^ Sir^ 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or .uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49' A.L.R.3d 128?i~ 
1
 Necessity and propriety of instructing ori al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach-of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case/ 52 
AX.R.3d 101. ,:,, ^ _,vwei, i^3ct*£A~>-.-
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,-construe* 
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out4of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed; 310.'-?** ^-^ J 
Key Numbers. — Trial *• 182 to 29$™ 
ple^ 52. Findings by the court. 
lEf Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
„yisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
delusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
I; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court* shall simi-
*y iset forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
unds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary "for purposes of 
view. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
"e findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
nsidered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
Wand conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
j the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
ecision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
sjart shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
tision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
aen the motion is based on mor^ than one ground.
 ;i. - ^,.^-^v.* 
Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
r
 of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
i and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
/actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
e evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
le party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to c 
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such findings or has made either a motion to amend them} a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. * 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived byA the 
parties to an issue of fact: ' ' •' i , f 
" (1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
 r; ; J! 
'( ; ; (2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; ,i.':i 1 
; '' (3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. -< ! / 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) .
 y ,.,. . 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to -' •' > -
Rule 52, F.R.CP: " v ; ",; ;J; . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS' 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. ; fnorvi:^/ . -
•—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. v l r ^ \ 
—Breach of contract r ' 
—Child custody.' > : ' 
-^Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. ••"••*. 
^Divorce decree modifications, 
—Easement. l - '^ *»v | 
—Evidentiary disputes.«» 
-^Juvenile < action, v.., < ^ ,: 
—Material issues. 
——Harmless error. [ • • i 




^-—Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment^ •v;;;jH;vr .-•,,../;* -, 
— M o t i o n S ^ ' ^ -^ :-:••'.:•". •-.?.. -.'.';'• 
i-i—Caption. * ;iv;' v '*•• ~-
——Conformance with original findings. 
*-*—New trial.-r:'j n jr.. J'pr -».--v 
^—Notice.of,appesJ,,.^^
 M ^ J A
 -Time.f'^ " J" " ^ -
—Found insufficient. .: ::,••'",«
 A;T ^ ' ";f£?, 
Hr—Vacation of judgment.? .< v
 r,7 .< H^ -» 
—Found sufficient. :" r 
—Opinion or memorandum,of decision.-,^:. 
i ^P.^di 
\M 
. . V ; 
*•>.!! ' 
—Recitals, of procedures^r t, ft 




 ;, $ 
Waiver* >, i *« »•.-.•., r.;i. . .•/•?•'.].•; 
—Failure of court. 
When filed.:iM ;/< v^M&I-v 1. 
—Tardy.filing.v, •^:(i.l\i:^1 -rj',,: - :'^,;^:i 
Ci te^ rvil'^xji . ^  ^i'^i •;- .^. .' .... :';-r*r 
Adoption. ...,.-'•.. .-• • . .«^^v;,/-.._'.,;,'; 
—Abandonment of contract \ 'J ; ;^; 
„ In a contract action by a real estate broker 
for his commission, where the defendant raises 
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his 
answer, the! court should make findings on the 
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact oil all material issues 
"h. 
' .b:^r 392 (Utah 1980)-
>Jii -i-Breach of contract * 
Romrell v. Zibns Fir^'Natl Bank;* 611 P.2d 
.r r. is reversible error where < it. is-prejudicial. 
.\1 Gaddillnv/ Co* v< Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43; 278 
Auum„ r .. f#. ..... . , . . , , - . , P ^ "P*2d'284'(1954)^/^f OjV :Wi™::r>nz 
^^Toll irir oP £jfc^t$*io^^ 
—^When made.fDr ...fM& •'-?«r^w^a: f~cJxjot?,The:. trial court • has the iresponsibility'}to 
—^Overruling.ory vacation, ^ t ' ^ ) t ^ i i i 5 m > o tinake.findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
^•^r:Another o^strict judge.^- ^ .^ ^ ;;r^^rnotwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury 
Child custody1 awards. ; ^ v ?" —" • 
Criminal \ cases.^ h-r ^ r - • 
P ^ ^ ^ 1 1 ^ ™ 1 ^ i^f1^--> ^r! t ^ .b»f b^tfWhere plaintiflsi ni action for breach ofrconV 
iiflect.^;
 r . ^ , , .>,, , .,.j f '^n, tract, requested finding by court on material 
i7^1^0^ ^ . ^ ' T ^ J ^ ^ ' ir 7 f t i s sue ai to^whe&ef the foundation of their 
^ a t i b n to pjeadings^ r:^^ ., if.cy/ ^..*^toabffli«aIMa--l«k^tULin tfoondmJoe withnd-. 
Failure" ^j)bjectfeto^fir^gs.,0^j( i ; / t o ^ t 0 ^ o r d i n a n c e B ^ d restrictive covenants,,it 
™7• tff™WM^?? r^ , 1jTor-l^^ '?.'2 ^1 m3Cwas the duty of the court to make such a find-
Judicial w ? i i w v £ v ^ P.2d'30r(Uiahl975)^ " t>AAi » * ^ ^ « ^ 
'^Assistance^otcounsel.^ir/e^a: i^s;jxs,arto ^ijj:;;o ^•••v^vjrr^ WBilosnoffliifoacb 
^^tandarJiro^.i 
^—Concluaionri 
Criminal cases....* '^^ ''v^ ir,>.^ v'-n?H«H w x"7«v»—;-) W ^ A T ^ U J " « J V*^r^V^r^^~w: 
U^riminal , tr ia lsa T , • -::f *•* ^ ^ q felM:^S^ 
ions' of iaw/^ ^H O . ^ ^ f r ^ i ^ f-6nthe"foctorsreUeduponinawai^ 
;^0 i t ; ^/io, £iaiii firing: the, custody of a ..childLv Hutchison.y. 
^—Findings of. facts b^ jury< 
—•^ -Intent.^ .' ^ $''\-/•f'"^ \}k f
 Juvenile procoedihgs. j °; * 
Purpose of rule.v^ *f^rr{!s 
"Stipulations. •-> jlj V> f 
Sufficiency.
 t r fj, , .. 2 , " 
'—Allegations of pleadings. 
^Burden' ori: appeal.' HH. ; 
r!»JM^?rP1*^™Mty.of witnesses. ^ ^
 t ^ w 4 v > 
V 7 A 1 ^ ^ ^ itself is not si factiiki issue^tnat Is 
l^ V '^7'>''appropHateiir" the' subject"of the"trial court's 
$ -$h^.fmdings; rattierj/the findings of the ultimate 
,,rVM: :> facts implicitly reflect consideration of tiie be- ? 
•_v' lievability of the witne88es\ testimony. "Adop-, 
I •; n tion {6if McKinstray V^  MdOnstray,' 628 P.2d 
^ :' -^ 1286 Wtah-1981). ottL"312^^::^^."ts&jf I 
Rule 63 
view, judgment or order revoking or suspend-
ing professional, trade, or occupational license, 
42 AJLIUth 516. 
Constitutionality, construction, and applica-
tion of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
staying execution, w ^ * ™ ^ * ? ^ ! 1 ^ 
cation or judicial « l e 44 A U L J f t 1 W .
 :g 
Key Numbers. - Execution «- 76, 1 5 ^ 
177; Judgment *• 861 to 866. 
W1VU V* w « w . ~ ~ - . . _ 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judg 
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be 1 
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or find^ 
ings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularlyS 
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perfonff| 
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those f 
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he niac-
in his discretion grant a new trial. ' r * :" : f< :> T - . ^ r r t ^ 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil; 
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge|| 
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias ofj| 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite| 
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in * 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. '*^ ^'v* ' "'•,"l,A*5^fe 
' Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief t i i 3 | 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after tHef 
case has beta assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against^ 
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit; h6| 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified t# | 
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdidion]^ 
which^judge1 shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency, of the affidavit.v^l£o 
judg^ag&hist whom the affidavit is directed does hot question the legal suffifl 
ciencyof the affidavit, or if the judge tbwKom theiraffid&vit is certified p^M 
thai i t is legall^suffide^ in W try tlie WLselffj 
determine the matter in question.* No party1 shall be entitled in any case to Sm 
more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accomparj 
nied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application arS 
made-in good faith. * • ' " ' • • • • ; t* -;':« T \\ , -..,:' '"t\ _\J .-,, -• /V^l;^ 
.t\ib\)^TC^C^tANALYSIS..(».">J*»^^^»« pealed.:Bernard^.*,Murphy,-862 E2d 1023 
\ ^ i T - « J W < - •—<• ri^'l-t (Utah. Ct/App. 1993)* cert; deiiied;] 878, P.2d 
$T^c°*Jlr u«T r^"V 'n '***'<-***'' 1154 (Utah 1994).^ )&1>$ V--" : i^*& *}**# 
Ba*s\for dscroalfficatioiL; ^1: ; ^ ^ ^ ?u ,r.:u rJ^B^xik^eniolSnm^ 
W^^uX^y^Y^iy^KK^:^ <T;; -.mto ^once anr affidavit'is ffled questiomngtne^neu* 
Failure to;file,affidavit. - r ^ V ti***V*^Ul ItraWof a judge^e judge must either certifir 
.Finding)* entered -by.'successor.;.&ro\fwL rv»'i 
Nature; of affidavit ft* •/. 
•HDther diflability.w^ K 
Sufficiency of affidavit.
 ;. - v 
• Timeliness of, motion.''1; • '•;,•"' ;
 tj';!' 
;Untmiely,vfiling of affidavit, ^ ' v 
Validity, .of prior, rulings. /'* ., 
Written'findings not required..1 :^1\ 
C i t e & r ^ v H ^ -i>» &'^y;>M 
Action oh affidavit 
By characterizing and ruling on the affidavit 
filed tinder Subdivision (b) as if it were a mo-
t^ion,' and by making reference to his decisions 
; in other cases, judge risked improperly influ-
encing the review by another judge after certi-
fication^ The order went beyond the procedure 
outlined in Subdivision (b) and thus was va-
JJ: 
!} the - affidavits to; another; judge .for- review • jtf & 
^transfer the casec— must be followed even.if; 
- there is only minimal judicial action remain*! 
e
 ing to be taken in the case* Barnard v. Murphyp 
1
 882 P.2d 679 (Utan Ct App, 1994). : " : ; ^ 
!.•'• • A blanket prospective direction of automatic 
recusal is beyond the scope of Subdivision (b); 
thus, the appellate court would hot issueanM 
'' order that a district court judge disqualify him-|p 
• self immediately in any future case in whicnS 
:a plaintiff filed an affidavit Barnard v. Murphy, ^ 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct App. 1994). . ^ 
. B a s i s for ^qualification; ^ T ^ ' k ' 3 
. .- Judge's forming of impressions as to -the 
'" merits of the controversy at a pretrial hearing; 
and comments thereafter do not inland of;| 
themselves' justify disqualification to proceed $ 
? 
30-3-2 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725. 
Contract between husband or wife and third 
person promotive of divorce or separation, what 
constitutes, 93 A.L.R.3d 523. 
"Incompatibility" within statute specifying it 
as substantive ground for divorce, what consti-
tutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 989. 
Modern status of views as to validity of 
premarital agreements contemplating divorce 
or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22. 
Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
erning support or property rights upon divorce 
or separation as affected by circumstances sur-
rounding execution — modern status, 53 
A.L.R4th 85. 
Enforceability of premarital agreements gov-
erning support or property rights upon divorce 
or separation as affected by fairness or ade-
quacy of those terms — modern status, 53 
A.L.R.4th 161. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce, 
proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Lis pendens as applicable to suit for separa** 
tion or dissolution of marriage, 65 A.L.R.4th 
522. ; ^ 
Insanity as defense to divorce or separation 
suit — post-1950 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 277. -:r : $ 
Divorce and separation: effect of court order 
prohibiting sale or transfer of propertyv oh 
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance" 
policy, 68 A.L.R.4th 929. »?i4Qk 
Joinder of tort action between spouses with 
proceeding for dissolution of marriage; &4| 
A.L.R.5th 972. , 
Pre-emptive effect of Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions (29! 
USC §§ 1056(d)(3), 1144(a), 1144(b)(7)) with; 
respect to orders entered in domestic relations 
proceedings, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 503. >C 
Key Numbers. — Divorce *=» 12-38, 57-65,1? 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. w 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same; 
causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her 
husband. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CJL 1907, § 1209; 
C.L. 1917, 9 2997; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-
3-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS ~ 
ANALYSIS 
Both parties at fault. 
Cruel treatment. 
Both parties at fault. 
Marriage may be dissolved by making a 
grant of divorce to each party where each was 
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 2d 
82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971). 
Cruel treatment. >< 
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to 
cause great mental distress need not be aggra-
vated and more severe when directed toward ; 
the husband than when directed toward the 
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utatf 
1975). 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costal 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the othe^ 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The ortier 
may include provision for costs of the action. C . ~. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award cd£ 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevaile 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no feetijo 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters 




ftf In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
jide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
gSfenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other 
|m Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
nient may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
order either party to pay for the separate sup-
port and maintenance of the adverse party and 
the children, and enacts the present section, 
effective May 3,1993. 
pigment.' 
ilstory: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L. 
^ h . 137, 5 1. 
$peals and Reenactments. — Laws 
]£ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, 
de Annotated 1953, allowing a court to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
,4, from order. 
jney fees. 
Sward to attorney not permitted. 
Spitesting petition for modification. 
tibonable. 
[[ley's Hen on alimony. 
tempt proceedings. 
land expenses on appeal. 
•etion of trial court. 
nent of order or decree, 
bion. 
^ i u s . 
rof court. 
Nation and effect thereof. •"•• < 
r alimony. 
$$} from order. 
Jjpre there were no findings or evidence in 
d^as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court 
T&ded issue for disposition by trial court 
lowed wife's attorney $100 for services 
wed with reference to husband's appeal 
fmdgment modifying divorce decree. Par-
parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934). 
»me Court assumed that evidence sup-
fjiward of suit money to wife where no 
tpjiy as to wife's need was before the court 
al on judgment roll from the decree of 
Se, of action in husband and awarding of 
roes'of suit, attorney's fees and temporary 
Spy; to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 
Id 1005 (1947). : = 
& should have made findings regarding 
^reimbursement and ability to pay 
one party sought reimbursement of ac-
pg costs that had been incurred in pros-
f  ,the action. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 
) (Utah Ct. App. 1993).. 
ney fees. 
decree of divorce was obtained by 
mother of minor children against father, who 
was required to pay certain sum periodically for 
support, care, maintenance, and education of 
such children, and he, without sufficient cause, 
refused to comply with decree, as result of 
which mother was compelled to bring proceed-
ings against him, father was required to pay 
counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. Tribe, 
59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921). 
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to 
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of 
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925). 
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses of 
defending husband's divorce suit or to obtain 
credit therefor should be considered by court in 
determining whether to make award for ex-
penses of suit and amount thereof, such fact 
alone does not show that award is unjustified, 
and consequently fact that award to wife for 
expenses of defending suit was made after 
expenses were paid or credit extended therefor 
did not render award erroneous as showing 
that she had no need therefor. Weiss v. Weiss, 
111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947). 
Although there was no detailed presentation 
of facts establishing the usual requisite factors 
to support an award of attorney's fees, trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to plaintiff to enable her to pros-
ecute an action to enforce a provision of the 
divorce decree where the facts implicit in the 
proceeding and the evidence necessarily pre-
sented to the trial court, together with the de 
minimis nature of the award, constituted a 
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of trial 
court's discretion. Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1981). 
Trial court properly denied wife's request for 
attorney fees in divorce proceeding where she 
offered no evidence at trial to show the nature 
or amount of any attorney fees incurred or any 
need for court-ordered assistance in the pay-
ment of such fees. Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1982). 
429 
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1991, substituted "Section 78-3-31" for "Section 
78-3-3.1" in the third sentence of Subsection (1). 
, The 1992 amendment by ch. 98, effective 
April 27, 1992, in Subsection (1) added Subsec-
tion (c) and the subsection designations (a), (b), 
and (d). 
The 1992 amendment by ch. 290, effective 
July 1, 1992, in Subsection (2), substituted 
"order of the court upon the motion of either 
party" for "the court upon the.wrl, 
either party and payment of a j$6 
sentence, inserted "sealed parti' 
made a stylistic change iiUheV, 
and made stylistic changes in tfi 
sentences. r^.r, 
This section is set out as re^o 
Office of Legislative Research 
CounseL *. n ^  ^ v 
y-*0x 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Authority of court, upon entering 
default judgment, to make orders for child 
custody or support which were not specifically 
30-3-4.1 td 30-3-4.4* Repealed-
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals 
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
requested in pleadings of pr§y 
A.L.R.5th 863. J.^.rfi"' 
authority* duties, and jurisdi 
missioners, effective April 23£ffl 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Mainteir 
4
 health care of parties and children — DL 
" debts — Court to have continuing jiiris 
.
 ? l ( Custody and visitation *— Terminatip 
r,.. mony — Nonmeritorious petition for^ 
t i o n . U ' • ' r t /T^r/; w) ?o "«;W • !'?/.•&i« J^Ou':r*fcFU <u> . r r r 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may: in 
equitable orders relating to the children, property,.debts or^plf 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of$ 
(a), an order assigning responsibility for the payment;of; 
necessary medical and dentaj expenses of^ the dependence1' 
;,',..', >(b), if coverage is or becomes1 available at a reasonable^ 
r^ijoreguiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate h 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; ? >;^ 
(c) pursuant to Section, 15-4-6.5: -;.> ,; ,- , r^R 
r
 u>\ :'K:' ••; '• (i) ani order specifying which party is responsible for^  
,*;; ^ , joint debts^ oWigationspor, liabihtieso£ttherparties; 
incurred during marriage;^-> o) •rm«!r> t" -''on %,~* oi i | 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respectiv 
•' :vv obligees, regarding the court's division of dfebts* obligf** 
-<".%r oi'j ^ities;and fegdrdiiig the parties' s^^arSt^^eiirrenli adcL 
f ''^ t '\'r (iii), provisions for the enforcement of'th£se orders*? 
,..,>f,'
T
.(dj provisions for income withholding in accordance^ 
,'• Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and » .«:« .-.'*• .?.d~'. «3*u * 
(e) with regard to child support c>rders issued or modifi 
' January 1, 1994, that are subject''to income
 rwithhol 
.'p assessing against the obligor aii additional $7, per mohtli^ 
T0 i-, fee. to be, included in the, amount withheld and paick 
Recovery Services within the Department of Humaft^S 
268 
DIVORCE 30-3-5 
^f income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
% 5 . : : , • • • ' 
urtmay include, in an order determining child support, an order 
icial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
Behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
tjthe custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
ppropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
;ay include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
custodial parent. 
has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent, changes or 
r the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
*Jheir support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
l^'the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
r f r ..- ' • ' . ' " 
etermining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
^the child. ' 
qifa specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
nt, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
'^ provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
jkpourt ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
'& decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
t a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates |oarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
^fpund to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
ed.> i 
*der of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
on establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
Tding vyith a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
ythe person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
te any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
;tibn for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a ||Jmade and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
ttorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
§termines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
"nst in good faith.' 
$ion alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
gndparent; pr other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
2^.2.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
ourt may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
island court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
* i > > ' • - • 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts 
or obligations" in the introductory paragraph of 
Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and 
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the 
end of Subsection (3). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective 
May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the im-
mediate family" for "relatives" and "best inter-
. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 
V§ 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
% 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
*ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
|§ 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, 
994, ch. 284, § 1. 




RECOVERY SERVICES 62A-11-502 
PART 5 
;RSAL INCOME WITHHOLDING — NON IV-D 
LIGEES [EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1994] 
*L Definitions — Application [Effective January 
11, 1994], 
quirements of this part apply only to cases in which the obligee 
''ceive IV-D services. 
urposes of this part the definitions contained in Section 
Capply. 
^953, 62A-11-501, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 261, 
"61, § 8. § 13 makes the act effective on January 1, 
. — For citation to Title IV-D, 1994. 
er same catchline following 
32. Child support orders issued or modified on or 
Rafter January 1, 1994 — Immediate income with-
holding [Effective January 1, 1994]. 
'jegard to obligees who are not receiving IV7D services, each child 
Jer issued or modified on or after January 1, 1994, subjects the 
i obligor to immediate income withholding as of the effective date 
*r, regardless of whether a delinquency occurs unless: 
he court or administrative body that entered the order finds that 
the parties has demonstrated good cause not to require immediate 
^withholding; or 
iwritten agreement that provides an alternative arrangement is 
by the obligor and obligee, and reviewed and entered in the 
|by the court or administrative body, 
purposes of this section: 
cause" shall be based on, at a minimum: 
'i) a determination and explanation on the record by the court or 
ninistrative body that implementation of income withholding 
31d not be in the best interest of the child; and 
*ji) proof of timely payment of any previously ordered support; 
a determining "good cause," the court or administrative body may, 
'tion to any other requirement that it deems appropriate, consider 
«r the obligor has: 
:{i) obtained a bond, deposited money in trust for the benefit of the 
^endent children, or otherwise made arrangements sufficient to 
rantee child support payments for at least two months; and 
fii) arranged to deposit all child support payments into a checking 
bunt belonging to the obligee, or made arrangements insuring 
at a reliable and independent record of the date and place of child 
pport payments will be maintained. 
es where the court or administrative body that entered the order 
onstration of good cause or enters a written agreement that imme-
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diate income withholding is not required, in accordance with this £ 
party may subsequently pursue income withholding on the earlji 
following dates: 
(a) the date payment of child support becomes delinqueiif| 
(b) the date the obligor requests; or 
(c) the date the court or administrative body so modifies^ 
(4) The court shall include in every child support order issued c 
on or after January 1, 1994: 
(a) a provision that the income of an obligor is subject toing 
holding in accordance with this chapter; however, if for any 1 
provision is not included in the child support order, the obligo^ 
nevertheless subject to income withholding; and 
(b) with regard to child support orders that are subject to intl 
holding, an order assessing against the obligor a $7 per mS 
processing fee to be included in the amount withheld and paidfJ 
for the purposes of income withholding in accordance with th<i 
of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-502, enacted by 
L. 1993, ch. 261, § 9. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 261, 
§ 13 makes the act effective 01 
1994. 
62A-11-503. Income withholding for obligees not] 
IV-D services — Responsibilities of the i 
fective January 1, 1994]. 
(1) As of January 1, 1994, with regard to child support orde 
subject to income withholding, the court may not modify or is 
child support order or any other document, including a divorced 
contains a final child support order unless and until it receivej 
parties documentation regarding employment and information 
process income withholding in accordance with the requirements^ 
ter. 
(2) The court shall order the parties to provide the court withtts 
tion described in Subsection (1). The court shall provide thafrj 
together with a copy of the child support order, to the office a£ 
issues the order. *ik 
(3) If an obligor under a child support order issued or modified! 
January 1, 1994, has no source of income and there is no identifia 
shall swear to that fact in an affidavit submitted to the court, 
issue or modify the order, and shall provide a copy of that affidatjl 
with a copy of the order and the information described in Subsectid 
office. 'Jfftff 
(4) If an obligor cannot be located through the reasonable? 
obligee and the court, and for that reason the information describ 
tion (1) cannot be obtained, a verified representation of the obli$| 
ment or source of income, based on the best evidence available^ 
mitted to the court. The court may issue or modify the order, andi 
a copy of that verified representation, together with a copy of the| 
office. «/ \' 
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nance of a ski run that was alleged to create a fact, precluding summary judgment, as to 
hazard to skiers. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, whether a ski area operator was negligent in 
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). not supervising its employees in regard to the 
a . practice of reckless skiing. Clover v. Snowbird 
-Supervis ion of employees. ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
Evidence raised a genuine issue of material 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent Risks 
of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol Hill, 1980 
Utah L. Rev. 355. 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations 
within each ski area which shall include a Ust of the inherent risks of skiing, 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, S 4. ' :
 f -
Meaning of "this act," — See note following < 
same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
• • ' * ' i 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1. 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
! before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, $ 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
s i . •; . . "• • ; " • • ' • -
;
 NOTES TO DECISIONS ^ 
ANALYSIS Essential elements. . 
. . Findings. ,,. ,. . .. .„ . . . -
APP e a L Hearing. 
-Frivolous appeal. Paralegal services. , 
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer. State of mind. 
Discretion of court. "Without merit" and "good faith.* 
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78-45-3. Duty of man. 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support his wife when she is 
in need. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 3; 1977, ch. Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
140, § 3. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
of children, § 76-7-201. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Child's right to support. 




Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Estoppel to assert duty to support. 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
Child's right to support. 
A child's right to support is his own right, 
not his parent's. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 
P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
Parents are permanently "duty-bound" to 
support their children; however, the extent of 
that duty is not without limitation, and where 
the question of child support has been submit-
ted to a court of competent jurisdiction and a 
ruling thereon has been obtained, the more 
general statutory duty of support becomes cir-
cumscribed by the more specific duty imposed 
by the court. In re C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1983). 
—Retarded child. 
Trial court properly required husband to pay 
child support after the child reached 21 years 
of age where the child was retarded and inca-
pable of self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 615 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1980). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid himself of his duty to 
support his children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Divorce terminates husband's duty to sup-
port his wife except for any obligations im-
posed by the divorce decree. Gulley v. Gulley, 
570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Estoppel to assert duty to support. 
Children have a right to support, but where 
their mother and her second husband had pro-
vided it, mother was estopped to demand that 
her first husband also contribute support; since 
her demand was not in the nature of a claim 
for reimbursement, to grant it would have been 
in effect to give the children "double support" 
to which they were not entitled. Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
District court erred in deducting proceeds of 
medical and burial insurance policy from 
amount of special damages in action by father 
for wrongful death of son, since father was un-
der legal duty imposed by statute to pay cost of 
medical care and burial expenses for son and 
was thus entitled to recover amounts reason-
ably expended for that purpose; mere fact that 
plaintiff at own expense carried insurance to 
protect against such contingencies should not 
inure to benefit of wrongdoer. Ottley v. Hill, 21 
Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968). 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.5 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child 
support requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not 
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by the 
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after 
a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Proce-
dures Act, in an administrative proceeding. 
(a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); 
and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of 
child support requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review 
lie adequacy of a child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and 
a^limony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support 
amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support 
award required by the guidelines. 
ory: C. 1953, 78-45-7.3, enacted by L. 
214, § 5; 1990, ch. 100, § 4; 1994, 
, §5 . 
adment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
effeetive July 1, 1994, in Subsection 
substituted "equals or exceeds the base" 
for "exceeds the total" and deleted the former 
second sentence which read "When the stipu-
lated amount exceeds the guidelines, it may be 
awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-
7.2." 
15-7.4. O b l i g a t i o n — A d j u s t e d g r o s s i n c o m e u s e d . 
.* 
justed gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the 
combined child support obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive 
~ts of the child may be used to determine the award under these 
elines. 
ory: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. 
. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6. 
ndment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base 
combined child support obligation" for "child 
support award." 
-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
¥
'As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
cept under Subsection (3); and 
'(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
ist income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
cial security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
mpensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
onmeans-tested" government programs. 
177 
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(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of i 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Tra 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assist 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a pare] 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business i 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-emp 
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expe 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be review© 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the pa 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allowU 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ froml 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an a 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross fad 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income.9l 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statementsj 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unle 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verificafci 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income] 
returns. r! jj 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whej 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 3 | 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subs 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stiptd 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made thiaj 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be basedj 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from workl 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons ofsifl 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputj 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To inlp 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding c 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact] 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 'v J 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditional 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor cmm 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parenj 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the ex 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational tra 
establish basic job skills; or 
(i 
cus 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.7 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. 
C, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, 
118, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
(5)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
dings by court. 
;uted income. 
dings by court. 
Jthough a trial court entered findings re-
l by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court 
to enter any findings required under 
ction (7)(a), the findings on the whole 
•; insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 R2d 1018 
\Ct. App. 1993). 
uted income. 
yen though the court's findings of fact did 
not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because his job history and current employ-
ment options inarguably supported this impu-
tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in imputing income in an amount greater 
than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v. 
Hill, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 R2d 
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
15-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided between them in 
portion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is 
licable. 
) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in 
tion 78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is 
D50 or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as 
ws: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obli-
gation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
,een $650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of 
amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount 
dated using the low income table. 
) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined 
1
 support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children, 
tional amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown. 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Jennifer P. Lee (6765) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801)485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J ANNA GRIFFITH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
JANNA GRIFFITH, j 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge Leon A. Dever 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the issue for grounds for divorce 
before the Honorable Leon Dever, District Judge, on Tuesday, May 28, 1996. Present at 
said hearing were Plaintiff and her attorney, J. Franklin Allred and Defendant and his 
attorney, Robert M. McDonald. The Court having heard the arguments and presentations 
by the respective parties, and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
^?L/ 001231 
.;; PZ:L : 
''. /v;. '\ 
f 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a decree of divorce forever dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony heretofore existing between the parties on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. Said divorce shall become final and absolute on the date of its entry. 
2. All other issues raised by the pleadings in this action are reserved for trial to 
be commenced on August 7, 1996. 
DATED on this V day oCffey, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
*£ 
JLE LEON DEVER 
DtSTRICTTOURT JUDGE 
fiL/ 001230 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 1996, I caused to be hand delivered, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
a :\wpdocs\gri ffi t h -dec re c. di v 
"
3
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HLEDey. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
Order 
Case # 944300281 DA 
Judge L. A. Dever 
This matter came on for trial before L. A. Dever, Judge of the Third District Court 
on August 7, 8, and 13,1996. Counsel for the plaintiff and defendant and the parties 
were present. Testimony was taken. On Aust 9, 1996, Plaintiff made a motion to 
reopen her case. Notice to submit on that issue was filed with the Court on September 
3, 1996. On September 27, 1996, the Court denied plaintiffs request to reopen her 
case and denied plaintiffs motion to strike trial memorandum of defendant. All pending 
motions submitted to the Court having been resolved, the matter is ripe for decision. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. The parties were married on November 12,1976. Four children were born of 
the union. This action was filed on September 14,1994, and the parties were divorced 
on June 3,1996. By stipulation, the parties have agreed that the plaintiff is a fit and 
9 001634 
/ ) 
proper person to have custody of the children. The plaintiff objects to joint legal 
custody. The Court finds that the standard visitation schedule as outlined by U.C.A. 
30-3-35 and as supplemented by U.C.A. 30-3-33 law is appropriate in this case. 
2. At the trial, testimony was received from both parties as to the proper 
division of personal and real property, income, alimony and child support. 
3. Based upon the testimony and stipulation of the parties, the Court finds the 
following division of real property to be appropriate: House and lot to be awarded to the 
plaintiff subject to the first mortgage. Defendant to assume the second mortgage. The 
defendant is awarded a first right of refusal if and when the plaintiff determines to sell it. 
The equity in this property is $99,510.00. Defendant is awarded the Lake Point 
property. The Court finds that this lot is property of the marital estate as a result of the 
defendant's transfer to him and his wife. The value of this property js $25,000.00, it is 
unencumbered. 
4. Based upon the testimony of the parties and exhibits received, the Court finds 
the following division of personal property to be appropriate, 
PLAINTIFF: 
Item Value 
Grand Prix $7,000 
Kitchen ware 125 
2 
Cannonball bed set 900 
Queen Anne chair 50 
Bench settee 50 
2nd Refrigerator 100 
Washer& Dryer 100 
Couch, 2 Queen Anne 800 
chairs, etc. 
Couch and loveseat 2,000 
(downstairs) 
Stereo 1,300 
Couch, loveseat & chair 200 
(upstairs) 
Oval table & six chairs 200 
Big screen T.V. 3,000 
T.V. stand 500 


















































Riding lawn mower 
Sub-Total 
Defendant's IRA 















Sub-Total 17,500 17.500 
Total $118,474 
5. The total amount of marital real and personal property awarded to each party 
is as follows: Plaintiff personal $45,241 
real 99.510 
Total $144,751 
Defendant personal $118,474 
real 25.000 
Total $143,474 
6. There are various other items listed by both parties that the Court does not 
fil 001630 
find to be appropriate for inclusion in the list of property to be divided. These items are 
a. The icemaker, refrigerator, microwave and dishwasher. These items 
are properly part of the value of the home and have been valued there. 
b. The $25 and $200 savings bonds were gifts to the defendant and are 
not included in marital property. 
c. The framed pictures from defendant's grandmother, which were not 
valued, are awarded to the defendant. 
d. The plaintiff claims that some value should be attributed to the 
Christenson and Griffith stock that Gary Griffith intends to transfer to his son. Gary 
Griffith testified that he has not transferred any stock to his son at this time. The claim 
for value to be attributed to a future gift is without merit and is denied. 
e. All other personal property not included is awarded to the party in 
possession. 
7. Child support is determined pursuant to statute. The amount of income 
attributable to the plaintiff is $1313 a month. This is the income derived from her job at 
Key Bank and based upon plaintiffs exhibit 112. Defendant's income is $4955 a 
month. This income is derived from his job at Christenson & Griffith and is based upon 
his weekly pay from defendant's exhibit 152 plus a yearly bonus derived from 
testimony. The bonus figure was determined on a six year average. The plaintiff 
• • •
 6
 " • ' " ; • ' 
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argues that the side income the defendant traditionally earned should be imputed to 
him at this time. The evidence established that the side income ceased in 1995. The 
evidence is that the defendant is not underemployed. The plaintiff argues that the 
defendant should be compensated more for the work he does for the corporation. The 
defendant testified that he works extra hours to help his father and brother since they 
are unable to work full time. The defendant is paid for full time work. The fact that he 
does extra work for his family members does not mean he is underemployed. The 
defendant testified that he does this extra work in order to keep the business viable. 
The Court finds that the corporation regularly pays a bonus and that the 
average is proper to be included in the salary of the defendant for child support 
purposes and on a monthly basis. U.C.A. 78-45-7.5(5)(a). The defendant has argued 
that the bonus should be taken into account for child support only after paid at the 
year's end. The defendant argues that his base salary should be the basis of the 
support order and a recalculation of the child support amount should occur after the 
payment of the bonus. Although this approach has some merit, the Court finds that this 
approach would entangle the parties in a yearly re-evaluation of the child support which 
would not be beneficial to anyone concerned and would not comply with the statute 
cited above. Based upon the Court's calculations the total child support is $1740. 
Defendant's portion to be paid to the plaintiff is $1376.00 a month. Based upon the 
:• Jptf 001628 
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performance of the defendant in regularly paying the temporary orders on support, the 
standard provision for withholding is not ordered until the defendant fails to make 
payment. Support to continue until each child reaches eighteen or graduates from high 
school with his or her regular class. The defendant is awarded three deductions for tax 
purposes. One deduction is awarded to plaintiff. U.C.A. 78-45-7.2. When there is only 
one child left to be claimed as a deduction, the parties shall alternate years in claiming 
the child. An accounting of child support is not ordered at this time. 
8. This is a marriage of nineteen years. The parties have become accustomed 
to a comfortable lifestyle. It is appropriate based upon the disparity of income that 
support be awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that her monthly expenses are 
$4115.44. The defendant disputes this amount and claims that $2910 is the correct 
amount. Part of the difference is realized by the defendant's agreement to absorb 80% 
of the dance and school activities costs and insurance costs relating to him and his 
daughter. The defendant does not dispute the plaintiffs claims for mortgage, utilities, 
food, clothing, automobile expenses, cable T.V., newspapers and books, haircuts, and 
entertainment. The undisputed amount is $2806. The remaining amounts claimed by 
the plaintiff are disputed and insufficient or no evidence was introduced to support her 
claims. The undisputed amounts claimed by the plaintiff are presumably those 
necessary to support her and her children in their accustomed lifestyle. Child support 
8 
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and the plaintiffs income(second job included) combined are $2769. Defendant's 
income minus child support is $3579. Alimony in the amount of $400 would be 
appropriate in that it roughly equalizes the parties and allows the plaintiff the necessary 
sum to continue in the lifestyle the parties shared during the marriage. The alimony is 
to continue for nineteen years subject to the standard terms and conditions. 
9. The parties have accumulated certain debts. The defendant has agreed to 
assume the debt to his grandmother, which is the second mortgage on the residence, 
and the Key Bank Silver MasterCard. The plaintiff has agreed to assume the debt to 
AT & T, First Card Visa, Citibank Visa, Key Preferred Line, Key Bank Visa, Key Credit 
Line. The debt owing to Dr. Olsen is to be paid by the defendant. Any other pre-
separation debts to be split between the parties. Any debt, other than those named 
above, incurred after September 14, 1994, is the responsibility of the party incurring the 
debt. 
10. Certain information relating to the Christenson & Griffith Corporation is in 
the possession of the plaintiff. The Houghlihan Report is proprietary information and 
may not be disclosed by the plaintiff to third parties. 
11. The attorney's fees generated by this case are not reasonable. Both parties 
are gainfully employed, the division of property and income is roughly equal and 
therefore both sides are to assume their own fees, with the exception of those fees 
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previously awarded to the defendant and the fees incurred by the defendant in 
opposing the motion to disqualify his counsel. 
Counsel for the defendant to prepare the appropriate findings, conclusions, and 
decree. 
Dated this 11th day of November, 1996 
L. A. Dever 
Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed 
this f V^dav of November, 1996, to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred Robert M. McDonald 
321 South 600 East 3269 South Main, Ste 270 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 Satt-take City, UT 84115 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
Order 
Case # 94 430 0281 DA 
Judge L. A. Dever 
This matter originally came on for hearing on for trial on August 7, 8, and 13,1996, 
before the Honorable L A. Dever. Various post trial motions were filed. The Court entered its 
order on November 11, 1996. Counsel for defendant was ordered to prepare the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Decree. On or about November 15, 1996, proposed Findings, Conclusions, 
and Decree was submitted. Plaintiff filed an objection to the proposed documents on 
November 25, 1996. 
The Court has reviewed the plaintiffs objections and directs counsel for the defendant 
to make the following changes to the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree submitted. The 
following numbered paragraphs correspond to the paragraph numbers in the Findings: 
7. Defendant has ten (10) days after receipt of any offer to purchase to notify the 
plaintiff of his intention to exercise his right of refusal. Defendant has thirty (30) days from his 
3Y QC1702 
notification to the plaintiff of his intention to exercise his option to purchase for an amount 
equal to the purchase price stated in the offer. 
20. Insert language that to include a yearly adjustment would entangle the parties, 
foster disputes and not comply with 78-49-7.5(5)(a). 
24. Insert after the first sentence the following sentence: The evidence established that 
the majority of income received for these "side-jobsn was used to improve or finish portions of 
the residence of the parties. 
25. Strike the last sentence of the paragraph. 
28. Begin the paragraph with the following: Due to the fact that the defendant is 
employed in a family business where his children come and go, it would not be in the best 
interest of the children for discussions of support and withholding issues to be occurring where 
they may hear. Further, the evidence . . . (etc.) 
34. In the fourth sentence strike the sum of $400 per month as. The clause should 
now read Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff alimony for a period of 19 years. 
39. Replace with the following: This is a divorce involving two salaried individuals with 
a modest marital estate and no dispute as to custody. The Court finds that the attorneys fees 
claimed for the motions and memoranda filed by the plaintiff are unreasonable. 
44. Strike the portion allowing prejudgment interest. 
The following paragraphs correspond to the paragraph numbers in the Conclusions and 
are in addition to those change which would correspond to changes in the Findings: 
24. Last sentence should be corrected to read: . . . 19 year period if Plaintiff... 
2 
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31. Strike in violation of the provisions of Rule 11. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and replace with without merit. 
The Court has considered all the objections of the plaintiff to the Findings and 
Conclusions. All objections except those noted above are denied. 
All other objections and motions filed by the plaintiff and the defendant that have not 
been previously addressed are hereby denied. 
Counsel for the defendant is to revise the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree in 
accordance with the changes in this Order and submit to the Court for its signature. 
Dated this 13th day of January, 1997 
Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed this 
day of January, 1997, to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Robert M. McDonald 
3269 South Main, Ste 270 
City, UT 84115 
# * ^ ^IQWiMOY^ 
Depdty Court Clen 
££, 001700 
Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
Attorney for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J ANNA GRIFFITH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 944300281 DA 
Judge Lee Dever 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Lee A. Dever, District Judge, on 
August 7, 8 and 13, 1996. Present at said hearing were Plaintiff and her attorney, John 
Franklin Allred and Defendant and his attorney Robert M. McDonald. On August 9,1996, ^ 
Plaintiff made a Motion to Reopen her Case. A Notice to Submit on that issue was filed 
with the Court on September 3,1996. On September 27, 1996, the Court denied Plaintiffs 




Request to Reopen her Case and denied Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Trial Memorandum 
Submitted by Defendant. All pending motions submitted to the Court having been resolved, 
the matter is ripe for decision. The Court having heard the testimony of witnesses called 
by the respective parties, having reviewed the documents admitted into evidence during the 
course of the trial, and having reviewed all of the documents in the Court file, and good 
cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
THE COURT FINDS: 
1. The parties were married, one to the other, on November 12, 1976. 
2. There were four children born of the marriage: Jennifer, born October 25, 1978; 
Brianne, born April 14, 1981; Chad, born September 5, 1983 and Brett, born June 
5, 1986. 
3. This action was filed on September 14, 1994, and the Court issued a decree 
terminating the marriage on June 3, 1996, reserving adjudication with respect to all 
other matters raised by the pleadings in the action. 
4. There is no genuine dispute that between the parties the Plaintiff is a fit and proper 
person to be awarded custody of the minor children born of the marriage. The 
interests of the children would be best served by awarding Plaintiff custody subject 
to the minimum visitation schedule outlined by Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 and 
supplemented by Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-33. 
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Based on the testimony and stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff should be awarded all 
right, title and interest in and to the Marital Domicile located at 454 West Vine 
Street, Tooele, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning on the North line of Vine Street 660 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 4, Plat B, Tooele City Survey, 
Tooele City, which point is also the Southeast corner of the 
Dunn property, running thence North 100 feet; thence East 100 
feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 100 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Beginning on the North line of Vine Street 553 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 4, Plat B, Tooele City Survey, 
Tooele City, running thence West 107 feet; thence North 100 
feet; thence East 107 feet; thence South 100 feet to the point 
of beginning (hereinafter "Marital Domicile"). 
The award of the Marital Domicile to Plaintiff is subject to the first lien held by Key 
Bank with an unpaid balance of approximately $64,500. Plaintiff should be required 
to indemnify Defendant, and save Defendant harmless, with respect to the claims of 
Key Bank arising out of said indebtedness. 
The market value of the Marital Domicile is approximately $164,000, leaving an 
equity (exclusive the second mortgage) in the approximate sum of $99,510. 
During the course of the marriage, Defendant has expended significant time and 
effort in improving the Marital Domicile and thereby enhancing the value of the 
Marital Domicile. By reason thereof, it is reasonable that Defendant be awarded a 
first right of refusal if and when Plaintiff determines to sell the Marital Domicile. 
In the event Plaintiff wishes to sell the Marital Domicile, and receives an arms-length 
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and bona fide offer to purchase the Marital Domicile, she shall promptly deliver said 
offer to Defendant. Defendant shall have ten (10) days after receipt of any offer to 
purchase to notify the Plaintiff of his intention to exercise his right of refusal. 
Defendant has thirty (30) days from the date of his notification to the Plaintiff of his 
intention to exercise his option to purchase for an amount equal to the purchase 
price stated in the offer. 
8. The Lake Point Property is part of the marital estate by reason of Defendant's 
transfer of an ownership interest to Plaintiff pursuant to a deed dated April 15, 1992. 
The market value of said property is $25,000 and not subject to any liens and 
encumbrances. 
9. Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the Lake Point Property 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 5.80 chains South and 45.36 rods West of 
the Northeast corner of Section 2, Township 2 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South 214.5 
feet; thence West 203 feet; thence North 714 5 feet; thence East 
203 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 1 acre more or 
less. 
10. Based upon the testimony of the parties and the exhibits received, the Court finds 
that all right, title and interest in and to the personal property described on the 
attached Exhibit "A" should be awarded to Plaintiff. The value of the personal 
property awarded to Plaintiff is $45,241 and the value of the real property awarded 
to Plaintiff is $99,510, a total award of $144,751. 
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11. Based upon the testimony of the parties and the exhibits received, the Court finds 
that all right, title and interest in and to the personal property described on the 
attached Exhibit "B,f should be awarded to Defendant. The value of the personal 
property awarded to Defendant is $118,474 and the value of the real property 
awarded to Defendant is $25,000 a total award of $143,474. 
12. The ice-maker, refrigerator, microwave oven and dishwasher are attached to or a part 
of the Marital Domicile and included in the value of said home and should be 
awarded to Plaintiff as part of the award of the Marital Domicile. 
13. The savings bonds hereinafter described were gifts from Defendant's grandmother 
and constitute Defendant's separate property. Bond number R65262347EE in the 
principle sum of $200; Bond number R65262348EE in the principle sum of $200; 
Bond number R64794715EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number 
R64578340EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number Q2220986522E in the 
principle sum of $25; Bond number Q2345483802E in the principle sum of $25; 
Bond number Q2250615826E in the principle sum of $25; Bond number 
Q2250615810E in the principle sum of $25; Bond number Q2071559559E in the 
principle sum of $25; Bond number R54222223EE in the principle sum of $200; 
Bond number R53982674EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number 
R98192458EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number R65206123EE in the 
principle sum of $200; Bond number R65261627EE in the principle sum of $200; 
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Bond number R65261626EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number 
R65262346EE in the principle sum of $200; 
14. All of the framed pictures painted by Defendant's grandmother, which were not 
valued during the course of the trial, should be awarded to Defendant as his separate 
property. 
15. Inasmuch as Defendant's father, Gary Griffith, has not transferred any stock of 
Christenson & Griffith to Defendant at the time of trial, Plaintiffs claim that the 
value of the stock constitutes marital property is without merit and denied. 
16. Any and all items of personal property not expressly identified in Exhibit "A, Exhibit 
"B" or in paragraphs 12-15 should be awarded to the party presently possessing such 
property. 
17. Plaintiff has a gross monthly income of $1,313 per month arising from her 
employment at Key Bank (Plaintiff's Ex. 12). 
18. Defendant receives a gross weekly income of $1020 arising out of his employment 
with Christenson & Griffith (Defendant's Ex. 152). Defendant's salary is determined 
solely by Gary Griffith and Ronald Christenson. 
19. Depending on the profitability of the business operations of Christenson & Griffith, 
Defendant may receive an annual bonus. However, the amount of said bonus has 
varied substantially during the preceding 6 years. There is no assurance that 
Defendant will receive an annual bonus, and no assurances as to the amount thereof. 
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The decision as to whether Defendant shall receive an annual bonus, and the amount 
thereof are determined solely by Gary Griffith and Ronald Christenson. 
20. There is significant antagonism between Plaintiff and Defendant which adversely 
impacts on the well-being of the children born to the parties. On this basis, it would 
be imprudent and unreasonable to require the parties to recalculate child support 
every calendar year during the post-divorce period on the basis of the annual bonus 
actually received by Defendants for such year. An obligation to recalculate child 
support at the end of each calendar year would require the parties to deal with each 
other in an adversary environment and thereby exacerbate the antagonism between 
the parties to the detriment of the parties and the minor children. A yearly 
adjustment would entangle the parties, foster disputes and not comply with Utah 
Code Annotated §78-45-7.5(5)(a). 
21. On the basis of the finding stated in the preceding paragraph, it is fair and 
reasonable that the Court impute to Defendant a sum of money equal to the average 
bonus received by Defendant during the years 1990-1995 in the sum of $535 per 
month.1 Defendant's salary together with the average bonus, results in a gross 
monthly income equivalent of $4,955 per month. 
22. Defendant is one of two construction managers employed by Christenson & Griffith. 
The other construction manager is Defendant's brother, Paul Griffith. In April, 1995, 
^ e total bonus received by Defendant during the period 1990-1995 was $38,500. This results in an 
average annual bonus of $6,416 ($38,500 divided by 6 = $6,416). This is a monthly equivalent of $535 ($6,416 
divided by 12 = $535). 
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Paul Griffith was diagnosed with leukemia. The physical and psychological impact 
of the disease substantially impairs Paul Griffith's ability to perform the functions of 
his employment. By reason thereof, Defendant has been required to perform a 
substantial portion of Paul Griffith's duties in addition to Defendant's responsibilities 
which has increased the stress inherent in Defendant's job and the number of hours 
of work at Christenson & Griffith. 
Gary Griffith, Defendant's father, is the chief operating officer of Christenson & 
Griffith Construction Company. In January, 1993, Gary Griffith was elected to the 
Tooele County Commission. Since undertaking this responsibility, there has been a 
substantial increase in the amount of time necessary to perform his duties as a county 
commissioner. Beginning in 1994, Gary Griffith began devoting more time to his 
county commission duties. Since that time, Defendant has been required to perform 
a substantial portion of the duties previously performed by Gary Griffith. This 
additional responsibility has increased the stress inherent in Defendant's job and the 
number of hours of work at Christenson & Griffith. 
During the period commencing in September, 1983, and continuing until April, 1995, 
Defendant occasionally performed "side-jobs" in order to generate extra income. The 
evidence established that the majority of income received from these "side-jobs" was 
used to improve or finish portions of the residence of the parties. This side-job 
activity terminated in April, 1995 by reason of significant increase in demands of 




Defendant's brother's illness and the involvement of Defendant's father in county 
government. Plaintifif failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any facts * 
or circumstances which would justify imputing income historically received from said 
side-jobs to Defendant. 
25. The fact that Defendant does extra work for Christenson & Griffith by reason of his 
brother's illness and the involvement of his father in county government, and does 
not receive additional compensation from Christenson & Griffith, does not mean • 
Defendant is voluntarily underemployed. 
26. The undisputed evidence establishes that Defendant is employed in a demanding 
occupation on a full-time basis at Christenson & Griffith and works in excess of 50 
hours per week. 
27. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff, for the use and benefit of the minor ^ 
children born of the marriage, the sum of $1,376 per month as child support effective 
November 11, 1996. A copy of the child support worksheet used to determine the 
amount of this obligation is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Child support should 
continue with respect to each child until such child attains that age of 18 years or the 
date that the child's classmates are scheduled to graduate from high-school, 
whichever last occurs. 
28. Due to the fact that Defendant is employed in a family business where his children 
come and go, it would not be in the best interest of the children for discussions of • 
support and withholding issues to be occurring where they may hear. Further, the 
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evidence established Defendant has regularly complied with temporary orders with 
respect to alimony and child support, it is unnecessary to require mandatory 
withholding unless and until such time as Defendant is in default in making said 
payments of child support. 
Based upon the respective incomes of the parties, Defendant should be awarded the 
right to take three of the children as dependency deductions on his state and federal 
income tax returns. In the event state or federal tax laws hereafter permit a tax 
credit for dependent children, Defendant shall be entitled to the tax credit for three 
children. Plaintiff should be awarded the right to take one of the children as a 
dependency deduction on her state and federal income tax returns. In the event 
state or federal tax laws hereafter permit a tax credit for dependent children, Plaintiff 
shall be entitled to the tax credit for one child. At such time as only one child is 
qualified to be claimed as a dependency deduction or qualifies for a tax credit, the 
parties shall alternate years in claiming said child. 
During the course of the marriage, Defendant has maintained a policy of medical 
insurance naming the minor children born to the parties as insureds. The premium 
for the medical insurance is fully paid by Defendant's employer. Notwithstanding 
such coverage, Plaintiff has obtained medical insurance through her employer 
wherein the children are named as insureds thereby providing duplicative coverage 
for the minor children. The premium for the insurance obtained by Plaintiff is 
approximately $53 per month. 
-
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31. By reason of the ages of the minor children, and the close proximity of the paternal 
grandparents, neither party is required to obtain work-related child care services. 
32. An accounting of child support is not ordered at this time. 
33. Plaintiff claims her monthly living expenses total $4,115.44. Defendant claims that 
Plaintiffs living expenses total $2,910. A portion of the discrepancy arises from 
Defendant's agreement to pay 80% of dance and school activities and car insurance 
costs relating to his daughter. Defendant did not dispute Plaintiffs claim with 
respect to the mortgage installment payment, utilities, food, clothing, automobile 
expense, cable TV, newspapers and books, haircuts and entertainment. The 
undisputed amount is $2,806. Considering the evidence presented by the respective 
parties, Plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence monthly 
living expense in excess of $2,806. The living expenses of $2,806 are sufficient to 
support Plaintiff and her children in their accustomed life-style. 
34. Plaintiff has living expenses of $2,806 and a total gross income (including wages from 
primary occupation, second job and child support) of $2,769. Defendant's income 
less child support is $3,579. An alimony award of $400 would roughly equalize the 
respective incomes of the parties and allows Plaintiff sufficient funds to continue the 
lifestyle the parties shared during the marriage. After considering the evidence 
bearing on the financial conditions and needs of Plaintiff; the ability of Plaintiff to 
produce income for herself; and, the ability of Defendant to provide support, 
Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff alimony for a period of 19 years from 
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September, 1994, the date Defendant began paying alimony. Defendant's obligation 
to pay alimony in the sum of $400 per month shall become effective November 11, 
1996. Provided, however, Plaintiffs obligation to pay alimony shall terminate prior 
to the expiration of the 19 year period if Plaintiff dies, remarries or cohabits with 
another person. 
During the course of the marriage, and prior to separation, the parties incurred 
indebtedness to Key Bank (secured by a first mortgage on the Marital Domicile), 
Aline Griffith (Defendant's grandmother secured by a second mortgage on the 
Marital Domicile) Key Bank Silver Mastercard; AT&T; First Card Visa; Citibank 
Visa; Key Preferred Line; Key Bank Visa; Key Credit Line; and Dr. Olsen. 
It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff pay and discharge the following indebtedness 
and indemnify Defendant, and save Defendant harmless with the claims of the 
following creditors: Key Bank (secured by first mortgage on Marital Domicile); 
AT&T; First Card Visa; Citibank Visa; Key Preferred Line; Key Bank Visa; Key 
Credit Line. 
It is fair and reasonable that Defendant pay and discharge the following indebtedness 
and indemnify Plaintiff, and save Plaintiff harmless with the claims of the following 
creditors: Aline Griffith (Defendant's grandmother, secured by a second mortgage 
on the Marital Domicile) and Key Bank Silver Mastercard; and Dr. Olsen. 
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38. The Houghlihan Report in the possession of Plaintiff, and any copies thereof, shall 
forthwith be returned to Christenson and Griffith and the content thereof shall not 
be disclosed by Plaintiff or her attorney to any other person or entity. 
39. This is a divorce involving two salaried individuals with a modest marital estate and 
no dispute as to custody. The Court finds that the attorneys' fees claimed for the 
motions and memoranda filed by the Plaintiff are unreasonable. 
40. Inasmuch as both parties are gainfully employed, and the division of property and 
income is roughly equal between the parties, and subject to the provisions of 
paragraphs 41 and 42-44, each party shall be solely responsible for the payment of 
their own costs and attorneys fees. 
41. Plaintiff and her attorney shall pay and discharge the costs and attorneys fees stated 
in the judgment heretofore entered by this Court on May 24, 1996, in the principle 
sum of $4,542. The judgment entered by this Court on May 24, 1996, and the 
Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law supporting said judgment, are incorporated 
herein by reference. 
42. Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney filed on January 4, 1996, was 
not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and was filed for an improper 
purpose to harass Defendant and cause unnecessary delay and needless increase in 
the costs of litigation. 
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43. The legal services performed by Defendant's attorney in opposing Plaintiffs Motion 
to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney were necessary and the time devoted to each 
service was reasonable. In light of the experience of Defendant's counsel, the hourly 
rate charged for said legal services was fair and reasonable. The costs incurred in 
opposing Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney were necessarily 
incurred and the amounts thereof are fair and reasonable. 
44. On the basis of the Findings noted in paragraphs 42 and 43, judgment should be 
entered for and on behalf of Defendant, and against Plaintiff and her attorney, John 
Franklin Allred, in the sum of $2,588.50, said judgment to hereafter bear interest at 
the statutory rate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action and 
venue is proper laid in the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded the sole care, custody and control of the minor children 
born of the marriage, to wit: Jennifer, born October 25, 1978; Brianne, born April 
14,1981; Chad, born September 5,1983, and Brett, born June 5, 1986. Said custody 
should subject to the minimum visitation schedule outlined by Utah Code Annotated 




Plaintiff should be awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims 
of Defendant, in and to the Marital Domicile located at 454 West Vine Street, 
Tooele, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning on the North line of Vine Street 660 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 4, Plat B, Tooele City Survey, 
Tooele City, which point is also the Southeast corner of the 
Dunn property, running thence North 100 feet; thence East 100 
feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 100 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Beginning on the North line of Vine Street 553 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 4, Plat B, Tooele City Survey, 
Tooele City, running thence West 107 feet; thence North 100 
feet; thence East 107 feet; thence South 100 feet to the point 
of beginning (hereinafter "Marital Domicile"). 
The award of the Marital Domicile is subject to a first lien held by Key Bank with 
an unpaid balance of approximately $64,500. Plaintiff should be required to 
indemnify Defendant, and save Defendant harmless, with respect to the claims of 
Key Bank arising out of said indebtedness. 
Defendant should be awarded a first right of refusal if and when Plaintiff determines 
to sell the Marital Domicile. In the event Plaintiff wishes to sell the Marital 
Domicile, and receives an arms-length and bona fide offer to purchase the Marital 
Domicile, she shall promptly deliver said offer to Defendant. Defendant shall have 
ten (10) days after receipt of any offer to purchase to notify the Plaintiff of his 
intention to exercise his right of refusal. Defendant has thirty from his notification 
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to the Plaintiff of his intention to exercise his option to purchase for an amount 
equal to the purchase price stated in the offer. 
6. Defendant should be awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims 
of Plaintiff, in and to the Lake Point Property more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 5.80 chains South and 45.36 rods West of 
the Northeast corner of Section 2, Township 2 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South 214.5 
feet; thence West 203 feet; thence North 214.5 feet; thence East 
203 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 1 acre more or 
less. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims of 
Defendant, in and to the personal property described on the attached Exhibit "A" 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
8. Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims of 
Plaintiff, in and to the personal property described on the attached Exhibit "B" which 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
9. The ice-maker, refrigerator, microwave oven and dishwasher are attached to or a part 
of the Marital Domicile and included in the value of said home and should be 
awarded to Plaintiff as part of the award of the Marital Domicile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims 
of Plaintiff, in and to the US Government savings bonds hereinafter described 
inasmuch as the Court has determined that said bonds constitute Defendant's 
separate property received as a gift from his grandmother: Bond number 
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R65262347EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number R65262348EE in the 
principle sum of $200; Bond number R64794715EE in the principle sum of $200; 
Bond number R64578340EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number 
Q2220986522E in the principle sum of $25; Bond number Q2345483802E in the 
principle sum of $25; Bond number Q2250615826E in the principle sum of $25; 
Bond number Q2250615810E in the principle sum of $25; Bond number 
Q2071559559E in the principle sum of $25; Bond number R54222223EE in the 
principle sum of $200; Bond number R53982674EE in the principle sum of $200; 
Bond number R98192458EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number 
R65206123EE in the principle sum of $200; Bond number R65261627EE in the 
principle sum of $200; Bond number R65261626EE in the principle sum of $200; 
Bond number R65262346EE in the principle sum of $200; 
11. All framed pictures painted by Defendant's grandmother, which were not valued 
during the course of the trial, should be awarded to Defendant as his separate 
property. 
12. Inasmuch as Defendant's father, Gary Griffith, has not transferred any stock of 
Christenson & Griffith to Defendant at the trial, Plaintiffs claim that the value of 
the stock constitutes marital property is without merit and denied. Even if Gary 
Griffith had gifted said stock to Defendant prior to trial, such stock would be 
considered Defendant's separate property and not subject to property division. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 730 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). 
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13. Any items of personal property not expressly identified in the attached Exhibit "A", 
attached Exhibit "B", or in paragraphs 9 - 12, should be awarded to the party 
presently possessing such property. 
14. There is insufficient evidence before the Court to impute to Defendant income 
historically received by Defendant from "side-jobs" performed after working hours 
and on weekends. The evidence established that the majority of income received for 
these "side-jobs" was used to improve or finish portions of the residence of the 
parties. 
15. There is insufficient evidence to impute to Defendant additional income by reason 
of extra work for Christenson & Griffith performed by reason of Defendant's 
brother's illness and the involvement of Defendant's father in county government. 
Furthermore, the Court concludes that it would be inequitable to impute such 
income to Defendant inasmuch as such income is not received by Defendant and 
Defendant does not have the power or authority to increase his salary by reason of 
such extra work. 
16. Defendant is employed in a demanding occupation on a full-time basis at Christenson 
& Griffith and works in excess of fifty hours per week. On this basis, the Court 
concludes that Defendant is not voluntarily underemployed in any respect. 
17. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff, for the use and benefit of the minor 
children born of the marriage, the sum of $1,376 per month as child support effective 
November 11, 1996. A copy of the child support worksheet used to determine the 
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amount of this obligation is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Child support should 
continue with respect to each child until such child attains the age of 18 years or the 
date of that the child's classmates are scheduled to graduate from high school, which 
ever last occurs. 
Due to the fact that Defendant is employed in a family business where his children 
come and go, it would not be in the best interests of the children for discussions of 
support and withholding issues to be occurring where they may hear. Further, the 
evidence establishes Defendant has regularly complied with temporary orders 
concerning alimony and child support, the Court concludes it is unnecessary to 
require mandatory withholding until such time as Defendant is in default in making 
child support payments. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.21, the Court 
concludes that Defendant should be awarded the right to take three of the children 
born to the parties as dependency deductions on his state and federal income tax 
returns. In the event state or federal tax laws thereafter permit a tax credit for 
dependent children, Defendant shall be entitled to take the tax credit for three 
children. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.21, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiff should be awarded the right to take one of the children as 
dependency deductions on her state and federal income tax returns. In the event 
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state or federal laws hereafter permit tax credit for dependent children, Plaintiff shall 
be entitled to use the tax credit for one child. 
21. At such time as only one child is qualified to be claimed as a dependency deduction 
or qualifies for a tax credit, the parties shall alternate years in claiming said child. 
22. During the course of the marriage, Defendant has maintained a policy of medical 
insurance naming the minor children born to the parties as insureds. The premium 
for this insurance is fully paid for by Defendant's employer. Notwithstanding such 
coverage, Plaintiff has obtained medical insurance through her employer wherein the 
children born to the parties are named as insureds thereby providing duplicative 
coverage for the children. The coverage maintained by Plaintiff requires her to pay 
a premium of $53 per month. Pursuant to the guidelines states in Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-45-7.15(2), Defendant should be ordered to maintain the existing 
medical insurance naming the children as insureds so long as it is available through 
his employment. In the event Plaintiff chooses to continue duplicative medical 
coverage for the children, she shall be solely responsible for the payment of the 
portion of the premium attributable to the children. 
23. The Court concludes on the basis of the facts presented at trial, there is no necessity 
at the present time to require Plaintiff to account for child support received from 
Defendant. 
24. The Court concludes that Defendant should pay to Plaintiff, for the use and benefit 
of Plaintiff, the sum of $400 per month as alimony. Plaintiffs alimony obligation 
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shall continue for a period of 19 years from September, 1994, the date Defendant 
began paying alimony. Defendant's obligation to pay alimony in the sum of $400 per 
month shall become effective November 11, 1996. This determination has been 
made on the basis of the guidelines outlined in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 
1985). Inasmuch as Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(7), which purports to codify the 
guidelines for determination of alimony awards, was not in effect at the time this 
action was commenced, the guidelines stated in Jones v. Jones, Supra, are applicable 
in this case. However, after considering the guidelines stated in Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-3-5(7), the Court's decision with respect to Plaintiff's alimony 
obligation would be the same. Provided, however, Defendant's obligation to pay 
alimony shall terminate prior to the expiration of the 19 year period if Plaintiff dies, 
remarries or cohabits with another person. 
The Court concludes that Plaintiff should pay and discharge the following 
indebtedness and indemnify Defendant and save Defendant harmless, with respect 
to the claims of the following creditors: Key Bank (secured by first mortgage on 
Marital Domicile); AT&T; First Card Visa; Citibank Visa; Key Preferred Line; 
Key Bank Visa; Key Credit Line. 
The Court concludes that Defendant should pay and discharge the following 
indebtedness and indemnify Plaintiff, and save Plaintiff harmless with respect to the 
claims of the following creditors: Aline Griffith (Defendant's grandmother, secured 
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by a second mortgage on the Marital Domicile) and Key Bank Silver Mastercard; and 
Dr. Olsen. 
27. The Court concludes that the Houghlihan Report in the possession of Plaintiff and 
any copies thereof, shall forthwith be returned to Christenson & Griffith and the 
content thereof shall not be disclosed by Plaintiff or her attorney to any other person 
or entity. 
28. The Court concludes that the costs and attorneys fees claimed by Plaintiffs attorney 
in representing Plaintiff in this action are unreasonable in light of the complexity (or 
lack thereof) to the issues involved in this litigation, the size of the marital estate, 
and the remedies sought by many of the motions filed by Plaintiff in light of the legal 
expense necessary to prepare said motions and supporting memoranda. 
29. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 30 and 31, each party shall be solely 
responsible for the payment of their respective costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
the prosecution and defense of this action. 
30. The Court concludes that Plaintiff and her attorney should pay and discharge the 
costs and attorneys fees stated in the judgment heretofore entered by the Court on 
May 24, 1996, in the principle sum of $4,542. In this regard the judgment entered 
by the Court on May 24, 1996, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
supporting said judgment are incorporated herein by reference. 
31. Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney filed on January 4, 1996, was 
without merit. The legal services performed by Defendant's attorney in opposing 
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Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Attorney were necessary and the time 
devoted to each service was reasonable. The Court further concludes that the hourly 
rate charged for said legal services was fair and reasonable. 
32. The Court concludes that judgment should be forthwith entered for and on behalf 
of Defendant, and against Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, in the 
sum of $2,588.50, said judgment to thereafter bear interest at the statutory rate. 
33. In order to expedite the Decree of Divorce to be entered in this matter, the parties 
should be ordered to forthwith execute and deliver to the other party any deed, 
certificate of title, bill of sale or other document necessary to transfer record title to 
property awarded to the parties herein. In the event either party has possession of 
property awarded to the other party, such party should be ordered to forthwith 
deliver such property to the other party. 
DATED on this »Q day orJanuart, 1997. 




C £ K I II K ' A I I ' « '' '•' * " '"• 
I hereby certify r;••..: jn :ni. da\ of Janu.t;' 199", I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, true ant. • < . 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 








Cannonball bed set 
Queen Anne Chair 
Bench settee 
2nd Refrigerator 
Washer & Dryer 
Couch, 2 Queen Anne 
chairs, etc. 
Couch and loveseat 
(downstairs) 
Stereo 
Couch, loveseat & Chair 
(upstairs) 
Oval Table & six chairs 
1 Big screen T.V. 
T.V. Stand 
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 Bond number D211219608E in the principle sum of $500; Bond number D211219609E in the principle 
sum, of $500; Bond number D211219610E in the principle sum of $500; Bond number D21121961 IE in the 


















Riding lawn mower 
1 Sub-Total 
1 Defendant's IRA 
Defendant's Retirement 
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EXHIBI1 C 1 
Robert M. McD< maid (2175) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
W D FOR T O O F L F rQT.TVTY STA7 T : OF T *T \\* 
JANNA GRIFFITH 
D\\ ID GRH -I II { 
CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(Sole Custody and Paternity) 
Civil No. 944300281DA 
Judge: Lee Dever 
1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother 
and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthh inu'me 
Refer to Instructions for definitions of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.) 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not entc 
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1.) 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This ^ the Adjusted 
1 Gross Income for child support purposes. 
MOTHER 
V 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number o-
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base 
Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. \ 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the j 
J COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. j 20 97c 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each 




— 1 — — 
- V M 
79.r c 






7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the 
Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. 1376 
9. 
10 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother ( ) Father 
Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in 
( ) Yes" " ( ) No If YES, enter the amount ordered: 
What were the reasons stated by the Court: for the deviation? 
property settlement 
excessive debts of the marriage 
absence of need of the custodial parent 
other: 
( ) Electronic filing ( ) Manual filing 
a:\wpdocs\griffith\fin-befo.jud 0C1704 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
Attorney for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
JANNA GRIFFITH, \ 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge Lee Dever 
This mallei came on for trial before the Honorable Lee A. Dcver, District Judge, on 
August 7, 8 and 13, 1996. Present at said hearing were Plaintiff and her attorney, John 
Franklin Allred and Defendant and his attorney Robert M. McDonald. On August 9,1996, 
Plaintiff made a Motion to Reopen her Case. A Notice to Submit on that issue was filed 
with the Court on September 3, 1996. On September 27, 1996, the Court denied Plaintiffs 
00174'; 
Request to Reopen lur Case and denied Plaintiffs Motion i«» Strike tin Trial Memoraiuh **n 
Submitted )•> Defendan ; pending iro-
nic iiicuici ia npe ioi decision. The Court having heard rlie testimo* \ < • \ i-nesses cai- d 
bT- "he respective parties, having reviewed d^ d* v-uin.: 
iiai, and having reviewed ui; ui die documents in tin CI-< o "-.-, .:^ -. >d 
;.;»-- appc.inng '"••' f^ Court having heretofore entered its landings ol I n ' 
..by 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. : t i le linilUi i h l l d i C l l u u i n v/i 
• MTI I . ' . *. -o i lennikr born October 25, lv s. Briann< born \pr ; i 14 !{>Q!; 
i . ; . . • - d \\\ s h o u l d 
subjeci to iiic lUiiiiji-wiii .ioiU:*-jii bdiedulc outlined in :> ;.*• v. de Annotated 5 30-3-
35, a copy of which is attached hereto as L,*.. 
2. , (^UiiM *f implementing the minimum visitation schedule attached a^  J \;,.- : 
"/ .a inuKc nie ehildreii uxii1 J " U) 
i 
.iitend hu-. " *si. . -n* .r- .ding funerals, weddings, frmPv r^um^m- \ ,„..M!S 
' •' e l i i c u i Uiu L U H U 
or hi viiw .iie ol eiHKr pai-.\ v\hkh ma> inadverkntlv conflict *. i!' I'-.- uc!t.i^.d-
juied to rs .p me children, Plaintiff shall ue present ..i the mania! domicile 
& 
or make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time 
Defendant returns the children after visitation. 
With respect to requests for visitation in excess of the minimum guidelines noted on 
Exhibit "A", Plaintiff shall consider additional visitation requests in the context of the 
best interests of the children which require that children have frequent, meaningful 
and continuing access to each parent and to have both parents actively involved in 
parenting the child. 
Plaintiff shall notify Defendant within 24 hours of receiving notice of any and all 
significant school, social, sports, and community function in which any of the children 
are participating or being honored, and Defendant shall be entitled to attend and 
participate fully; Defendant shall have direct access to all school reports and records 
and direct access to medical records and shall be notified immediately by Plaintiff in 
the event of a medical emergency involving the children; both parties shall provide 
the other party with his or her current address and telephone number within 24 hours 
of any change; Plaintiff shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact 
between Defendant and the children during reasonable hours and uncensored mail 
privileges; parental care shall be presumed to be better care for any of the children 
than surrogate care and the parties shall cooperate in allowing Defendant, if willing 
and able, to provide child care in lieu of surrogate care; Plaintiff and Defendant 
shall be entitled to equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the 
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does 
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not celebrate si tall have the right to be together with tin; i hild on the religious 
holiday. 
n is awarded all right, title and interest, :iee and J u l :M . : "m 
Defendant, in and to the Marital Domicile located i f -** * \ \ .. 
u o i as follows: 
Beginning on the North line of Vine Street 660 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 4, Plat B, Tooele City Survey, 
Tooele City, which point is also the Southeast corner of the 
Dunn property, running thence North.100 feet; thence Easi 100 
feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 100 feet in Hie point 
of beginning. 
Beginning on the iNort.. IUIL M v me Street 553 leet \\< >i •- • me 
Southeast corner of Lot 2, Block 4. Plat. B, Tooele Cit Survey, 
Tonele C'u>. running thence West 107 feet; thence North 100 
feet: thence East 107 leet; thence South 100 feet • • "v* - t 
of begmmne (here ip" f t , * r t% t tr,*! i ] n < t n < « -1 ';. 
6. . The awaru ..i m._ M-ii^a; . * ..neik u» I'laimili i- object '•" • l'\"-- i:r» K"M K ive/ 
Bank with an unpaid baiaiK. i :. . i^d 
t 0 jnciernnify Defendant, and save Defendant harmless, with respect to the claims of 
Key Bank arising out of said indebtedness, 
7. 1 * : '-'\ awarded a first right of refusal if and \\ii-_n 1*1.i* uili determines 
••• U sui : !> •mi*-*"1/ f" iU^ cv^nt Plaintiff w^Hrv, j n I 
I ! neth and bona fide offer to puu IMM fh( \l <ual 
Domicile, ^hc shall promptly deliver said offer to Defendant D d u ' u n . . ^.a,, have 
m n H^ i i t i i i i iu i ui uiS 
m 
intention to exercise his right of refusal. Defendant has thirty (30) days from the 
notification to Plaintiff of his intention to purchase for an amount equal to the 
purchase price stated in the offer. 
Defendant is hereby awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims 
of Plaintiff, in and to the Lake Point Property more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 5.80 chains South and 45.36 rods West of 
the Northeast corner of Section 2, Township 2 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running thence South 214.5 
feet; thence West 203 feet; thence North 214.5 feet; thence East 
203 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 1 acre more or 
less. 
Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims of 
Defendant, in and to the personal property described on the attached Exhibit MB" 
which is incorporated herein by reference. 
Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims of 
Plaintiff, in and to the personal property described on the attached Exhibit "C" which 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
The ice-maker, refrigerator, microwave oven and dishwasher are attached to or a part 
of the Marital Domicile and included in the value of said home and should be 
awarded to Plaintiff as part of the award of the Marital Domicile. 
Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest, free and clear of the claims of 
Plaintiff, in and to his separate property constituting of US Government savings 
bonds hereinafter described: Bond number R65262347EE in the principlc'sum of 
Q0174 5
- £f 
R 0 5 2 6 2 3 4 8 E E in the | W I I , . ; J , 1 W -urn *t O - H^ >', i-.;mi • ; 
R()4794715EL: n : pr inciple <;um ^f ^ • i ^ n r i numl . 
O2220986522E .i; .... i. =.-. - • v . 
Bond :. ^ i O2345483802L n u;
 : nnciplr - -r 
».>. iiu u u m b e i U225()615«10L .. 
pr inciple ;.-; ->t S25; Bond n u m b e r (J2()7 I559559E in the - n ^ e i p l e sum of 
Bond n u m b . 42222^ M Bond i iumu^i 
R 5 3 9 8 2 6 7 4 E E in the pr inciple MIMI m v ^ l u B. ..a . <98192458EF ir • » -
.'"•••viplc ^'jr-r nf $200; Bond n u n i i x : K O \ n n • „ s u; 
«• • ^ 6 5 2 6 i 6 2 7 E E in ilk, : MiKipu ^ • • M
 SK - . I 
R 6 5 2 6 1 6 2 6 E E in the pr inciple sum of s j i - -v 0*_^ l l 
13. Ah fi 'iiiH.; ;--u uires pa in ted • •. D e f e n d a n t ' s g r a n d m o t h c - * -K were nc-
dur ing ii- l <^ur<^ ' idant as ins separate 
property. 
14. Any items c >1 personal propenv ; • , . - . \ Lxlnbii b", 
attached Exhibit "C\ or in lae preceding paragraphs are hereby awarded \o the partv 
presently possessing such property. 
15. In . ib in cun ent possession of any of the personal property awarded 
to Defendant hcrem. PI.r^'iff shall forthwith deliver said property l ; i 
the event Defendant is in current possession of any of the personal property awarded 
to Plaintiff herein, Defendant shall forthwith deliver said property to Plaintiff. 
16. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff, for the use and benefit of the minor 
children born of the marriage, the sum of $1,376 per month as child support effective 
November 11, 1996. A copy of the child support worksheet used to determine the 
amount of this obligation is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". Child support should 
continue with respect to each child until such child attains the age of 18 years or the 
date of that the child's classmates are scheduled to graduate from high school, which 
ever last occurs. There shall be no mandatory withholding of child support unless 
and until Defendant materially defaults in the payment of his child support 
obligation. 
17. Defendant shall have the right to take three of the children born to the parties as 
dependency deductions on his state and federal income tax returns. In the event 
state or federal tax laws thereafter permit a tax credit for dependent children, 
Defendant shall be entitled to take the tax credit for three children. 
18. Plaintiff shall have the right to take one of the children as dependency deductions 
on her state and federal income tax returns. In the event state or federal laws 
hereafter permit tax credit for dependent children, Plaintiff shall be entitled to use 
the tax credit for one child. 
19. At such time as only one child is qualified to be claimed as a dependency deduction 
or qualifies for a tax credit, the parties shall alternate years in claiming said child. 
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20. Defendant shall Mountain the existing medieai .MsmaiKv -ura^i n.nniiiLi '' 
children bom o "... marriage a^  
through his employment. In the t \em li "i\* <<u^Ls i. _(•;:,,. lV. -iphcai^c 
•"•:'Jiral Cf^'ernee f° r the children. .. 
iiniitii attributable to the children. 
Mill .u • , )efendant ^hnV e~v fifty percent (50%) of all reasonable anu ik\c\M!\ 
:n« a iding deductibles and co paynie^u, 
. . . . . . .: * »\ukvl, h< )\vevcr, that as a condition to 
reimK ; >, i dental costs, die p -1 
incurring the medical or denial expense must provide written verification of the -^ 
qnd payment of the mcun^ ^ • ^ •. . 
ui Liie pa\ merit. 
22, Dcfciuiam shall pay to Plaintiff, for the use and ; . 
y Defendant's obligation u>
 t;a> almn-i * ^hal; ,-* ''in,. ' • ,1 
period of nineteen years from. September, 1994 thc date ;.;. :eikian: OLLM: , : 
•" ;y dimiuii^ iii tUc sum ol $400 per month •••.•!I 
become etievii\c \ « n u n l \ ! li i^ 'Mx Provided however, Defendan. • -'•-••'• 
pav I.L :*' ear pcriou n Plaintiff 
dies, remarnes oi ^ohahit> Aith anothci per^n 
23. P l a i n t i f f ^ d i o a v a . ^ d r . ; ^ , ^ ;. 
and save Defendant haomv.^, w.^. respect ie il^ .lainu of the ioliovung creditor 
-8- ^-) 0 0 
Key Bank (secured by first mortgage on Marital Domicile); AT&T; First Card Visa; 
Citibank Visa; Key Preferred Line; Key Bank Visa; Key Credit Line. 
24. Defendant shall pay and discharge the following indebtedness and indemnify Plaintiff, 
and save Plaintiff harmless with respect to the claims of the following creditors: 
Aline Griffith (Defendant's grandmother, secured by a second mortgage on the 
Marital Domicile) and Key Bank Silver Mastercard; and Dr. Olsen. 
25. Any debt or other obligation not described in the preceding paragraphs, incurred 
after September 14, 1994, shall be paid and discharged by the party who incurred the 
debt and the party incurring the debt shall indemnify the other party, and save the 
other party harmless with respect to the claims of said creditors. 
26. Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, are hereby ordered to forthwith 
deliver to Christenson & Griffith the Houghlihan Report and any and all copies 
thereof. Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, are hereby enjoined from 
disclosing the contents of the Houghlihan Report to any other person or entity. 
27. Subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, each party shall be solely 
responsible for the payment of their respective costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
the prosecution and/or defense of this action. 
28. Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, shall pay and discharge the costs and 
attorneys fees stated in the judgment heretofore entered by the Court on May 24, 
1996, in the principle sum of $4,542. The judgment entered by the Court on May 24, 
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1996, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supporting said judgment are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
29. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, and against Plaintiff and her 
attorney, John Franklin Allred in the sum of $2,588.50, said judgment to thereafter 
bear interest at the statutory rate. 
30. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each deliver to the other party any deed, certificate of 
title, bill of sale or other document reasonably requested by the other party to clear 
record title to the real and personal property awarded to the parties herein. 
DATED on this \Q day oNanuaiy\ 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
\ 
'lONQJiAJJLl-: L.r-I' DIvVI'R 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this / U day of January, 1997, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid. U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF 
DIVORCE to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
<S d L/yU^0j[k{n6x 
T 
Ls 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
U.C.A. § 30-3-35 MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION 
(Summarized) 
Reasonable Visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not 




One weekday evening to be specified by the non-custodial 
parent or specified by the Court from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m. 
Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and weekend schedule doesn Y 
change. 
Holiday Visitation: 
Odd Numbered Years 
(6:00 p.m. day before holiday to 7:00 p.m. day of unless 
specified otherwise) 
Even Numbered Years 
Human Rights Day 
Easter from Fri. 6:00 p.m. to Sun 7:00 p.m. 
Memorial Day Fri. 6:00 p.m. 
to Mon. 7:00 p.m. 
July 24th to 11:00 p.m. 
Veteran's Day 
Day before or after Child's Birthday 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
First Half Christmas Vacation, including 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 
to 1:00 p.m. 
New Year's Day 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11:00 p.m. 
Labor Day from Fri. 6:00 p.m. 
to Mon. 7:00 p.m. 
Columbus Day 
UEA weekend from Wed. 6:00 p.m. to 
Sun. 7:00 p.m. 
Child's Actual Birthday to 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving from Wed. 7:00 p.m. to 
Sun. 7:00 p.m. 
Second Half Christmas Vacation 1:00 




With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
With Mother 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
4 weeks during summer or, if year round, 1/2 school breaks, 
custodial parent allowed two weeks uninterrupted. Notification 
of summer visitation or vacation weeks with children should be 
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days in 
advance. 
Telephone: Contact at reasonable hours 
-11-
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EXHIBIT "B" 




Cannonball bed set 
Queen Anne Chair 
Bench settee 
2nd Refrigerator 
Washer & Dryer 
Couch, 2 Queen Anne 
chairs, etc. 
Couch and loveseat 
(downstairs) 
Stereo 
Couch, loveseat & Chair 
(upstairs) 
Oval Table & six chairs 
Big screen T.V. 
T.V. Stand 



























| SUB-TOTAL 1 
$16,975 
* II 
7 7 GOIVSJ 
Sub-Total 
Savings (with sister) 













 Bond number D211219608E in the principle sum of $500; Bond number 
D211219609E in the principle sum of $500; Bond number D211219610E in the principle 
sum of $?00; Bond number D211219611E in the principle sum of $500; 
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EXHIBIT "C" 








| Mitsubishi T.V. 





Riding lawn mower 
Sub-Total 



































Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
EXHIBIT "D" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






(Sole Custody and Paternity) 
Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge: Lee Dever 
1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother 
and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly ineome. 
Refer to Instructions for definitions of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this ease.) 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
obligations ordered for the children in Line I.) 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted 
Gross Income for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of 
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base 
Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the 
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each j 


















$ 6268 jj 
$ 1740 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the 
Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. 1376 
8. Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother ( ) Father 
9. Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in Line 7 ? 
( ) Yes ( ) No If YES, enter the amount ordered: 
10. What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) other: 
( ) Electronic filing ( ) Manual filing 
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1 because the defendant had all of the benefits available 
2 through his father's business. I think he's a shareholder, 
3 but we're going to put something on shares as well, I 
4 believe. All of the benefits that Christensen and Griffith 
5 had showered on David and Janna Griffith, the parties in this 
6 action prior, they're still available, they're still there 
7 and I don't think that the Court should even consider cutting 
8 Janna off the continuation of this living standard, this 
9 living style, is possible and that's what we're going to show 
10 the Court and be done here. And that's what we're asking and 
11 that's why that $1,800 figure's there. 
12 Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Just one minute. I'd like to call your 
14 attention. I was not aware that Paul Griffith is a brother 
15 to the defendant here. I had a conversation with him the 
16 other day - nothing to do with this case. I just wanted to 
17 let you know I did have a conversation. He and I have a 
18 common ailment that the doctor suggested I talk to him. He 
19 called me. And I want to call that to your attention, but in 
20 no way did I discuss this case or even know until this 
21 morning, I read the your memorandum that they were 
22 brothers. But I just mention that to you. 
23 MR. ALLRED: I have no problem with that. 
24 THE COURT: So I don't want anybody saying 
25 well, you know I don't know him I just talked to him 
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on the phone because the doctor had him call me. 
MR. ALLRED: Anything about side jobs, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: No. Nothing. 
MR. ALLRED: Was that prior 
THE COURT: That day we talked about horseback 
riding, if you want to know the truth of the matter. 
MR. ALLRED: Tennessee walker? 
THE COURT: No, he's a rodeo man. I'm a tux man 
wearing tuxes, you know. 
MR. ALLRED: Did that and that was prior to the 
time we filed the financial declaration? 
THE COURT: Yes. I just thought I mean, I 
think he talked to me last week in about a 10 minute 
conversation. He and I are undergoing the same type of 
treatment and I just wanted to know what effects he had so 
that I could anticipate what I'd have. And that was the 
extent of the conversation. 
MR. ALLRED: And the Court called him rather than 
him calling the Court. 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. ALLRED: The Court called him rather than him 
calling the Court. 
THE COURT: The doctor had him call me. I didn't 
call him. *.v 
MR. ALLRED: Oh, the doctor did. v 
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THE COURT: The doctor had him I didnft know 
him from I didn't know him. He just called me on the 
phone. I wouldn't recognize him if I saw him here today. 
MR. ALLRED: Thank you, Your Honor. ^ 
THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to bring thatuout 
so that there was no question about it. 
MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, I would like to briefly 
involve what the rest of this case involves. First of all, 
Your Honor, I would like to note to the Court the evidence 
will show there is no significant sacrifice on the part of 
the plaintiff in providing defendant with his education. 
During the years he attended school, which was only about two 
years, his tuition was paid by a basketball scholarship. 
Defendant or plaintiff, at the same time pursued her 
education, defendant worked and contributed to the family 
income so the notion that there's some type of sacrifice or 
lien on his income just isn't won out by the evidence as the 
case this all will show. And as the evidence will show. 
Secondly, Your Honor, Counsel made mention of the fact 
of 30-3-5, which said, "The Court may consider the fault of 
the parties in determining alimony." I submit, Your Honor, 
that that standard is not applicable to this case. That 
statute was effective May 1, 1995. This case was filed in 
September 1994. So at the time the grounds were being 
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morning. 
THE COURT: You may call your next witness Mr. 
Allred. 
MR. ALLRED-: Your Honor, I have a couple of matters 
I'd like to address the Court with first, if we may. 
Yesterday, the Court indicated that a witness in this case 
contacted the Court, if I recall correctly, Your Honor, said 
that at the time of the conversation, did not understand that 
this individual witness is Paul Griffith, who was a witness 
in the case pending before you. As I sorted this out last 
night, I'm concerned that perhaps that there has been an 
attempt to unduly influence this Court. 
THE COURT: Now, look.. Absolutely not. Now I want 
to tell you 
MR. ALLRED: I don't mean it with the Judge. I 
don't mean that at all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No. There was absolutely nothing. It 
was at my request. I'll have you know, Mr. Allred, that I'm 
suffering from a disease. 
MR. ALLRED: I understand that. 
THE COURT: And this individual, at the request of 
the doctor, called me, not to discuss this case whatsoever. 
The only discussion I had with him with regards to the 
treatment - he is evidently undergoing the same treatment. 
The doctor wanted him to advise me of what the effects of the 
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treatment were. And are. And that's the only thing. He 
never once mentioned anything to do about the construction 
business. We discussed horseback riding, we discussed what 
effects it has on your memory/ the effect it has on your 
riding, and that's all I wanted to know. And there's no way, 
whatsoever, that he in any way attempted or in fact, I 
appreciated the fact that he took the time. And someday you 
may be in my position and —-
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, I understand. Can I 
just as delicately as I can let you know how it appears 
from the.plaintiff's side? The issue was raised in advance 
of trial, that an individual has an unfortunate and probably 
very terrible disease. The issue was intended to be brought 
before this Court, in this proceeding, and we anticipated 
that would happen after Your Honor has sworn the witnesses 
after the start. But we find out yesterday and I 
approach this with extreme caution we find out yesterday 
that a contact was made, not initiated by the Court, not 
anything to do with the Court, but came from the witness 
THE COURT: Wrong. Wrong. I asked the doctor to 
have him call me. My wife asked the doctor to have him call 
me. He did not initiate the call at his request. It was at 
my request that he initiated the call. Because my wife and I 
are both concerned about the treatments I'm to undergo here 
in another couple weeks. No way did he initiate that call on 































his own. You want to call Dr. Symloski's office? You call 
Dr. Symloski's office. They're the ones that initiated the 
call. And this is a real affront to me to have this brought 
up at this time and I thought once and for all that these 
things would not arise again. And that's why I brought it to 
everybody's attention yesterday. We go through a whole day's 
trial, and then to think I'm going to be influenced by an 
individual who calls me, to advise me at the request of my 
doctor, I'm going to be influenced by that. You don't 
know me very well. 
- MR. ALLRED: I did not say that 
THE COURT: And your client doesn't know me very 
well either. 
.-•.<:. MR. ALLRED: And I didn't even mean to insinuate --
THE COURT: Then what are we talking about? 
MR. ALLRED: The information that we have was that 
the client had made the the witness had made the call. 
And from the plaintiff's standpoint, now that the Court 
communicates what it is from the plaintiff's standpoint, 
that's something which would cause us concern. What the 
Court indicates is that it did not know when the call was 
made/ after he requested the call, that this individual was 
involved. -
. THE COURT: I had no idea. 















































MR. ALLRED: So I certainly donft mean to insinuate 
anything had occurred, I just look at the situation. But 
what happened inadvertently then Judge, is this, if I 
understand what you're saying, and Ifm just looking what 
happend inadvertently was the information which would have 
been offered in the trial under oath came to the Court 
outside of the trial and outside of the presence, and the 
Court has indicated he talked about horseback riding, and he 
talked about the treatment and the effect. And again, I 
apologize for this, but it's something that --- here's 
evidence that was perceived by the Court, which 
THE COURT: Mr. Allred, do you realize that what he 
told me is what my doctor told me? He was just I wanted 
to find out what effects this disease and the treatment has 
on an individual. And you know, it's to your advantage that 
I know what Interferon does to a patient. You're not getting 
it from that list or that list. You're getting it from 
someone's who has been talking to a doctor and someone who 
has knowledge now of what Interferon does to a patient. 
You're also having the benefit of me understanding what Paul 
Griffith will be going through. And what he's gone through. 
So how is that going to affect and after I bring this all 
out I go through a day of trail yesterday. 
MR. ALLRED: Well, and I apologize for maybe being 
slow in the uptake, Your Honor. I say again, looking at it 
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from out standpoint and the Court's claims this morning, but 
as we talked further about it, it begins to appear and I 
don't know what the Court's ruling would ultimately be, but 
we're going to urge the Court that family aside, a coworker's 
illness is not a grounds to alter or impact the plaintiff's 
alimony or child support award. 
THE COURT: I understand that very well. 
MR. ALLRED: Well, would the Court feel 
uncomfortable in giving us an advisory ruling and if that's 
irrelevant 
THE COURT: Mr. Allred, in other words you're 
asking me to withdraw from this case at this time? 
MR. ALLRED: No, sir. I'm just saying that 
THE COURT: I don't want in this stage of my 
life, Mr. Allred, I'm not going to sit anymore. If you want 
to make a motion for me to withdraw. You make it. Will you? 
You do what you want to do. 
MR. ALLRED: That puts us in a very uncomfortable -
THE COURT: No. Well, you do what you want to do. 
You I tried I've been on the bench 11 years. And I 
don't want this late in my life, I'm no redoing things 
that in any way will reflect on my honesty, my integrity or 
character. 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, I beg the Court's 
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1 indulgence, I did not insinuate, I did not say I'm simply 
2 saying that 
3 THE COURT: And so therefore what? You're 
4 saying what? 
5 MR. ALLRED: All this body of evidence that they 
6 claim bears on what the plaintiff is going to receive here, 
7 and what has been said, again, we're slow on the uptake, but 
8 it was inadvertently it's some kind of a cosmic 
9 THE COURT: Well, make your motion. What do you 
10 want me to do? Tell me what you want me to do? 
11 'MR. ALLRED: I think if the Court were to rule that 
12 an illness of a coworker, and the family aside, an illness of 
13 a coworker is irrelevant in determining what the obligations 
14 of another worker are, we'd be satisfied. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. McDonald. 
16 MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, that's just outrageous. 
17 The fact of the matter is that is a very relevant fact. If 
18 he wants an advisory opinion I think that that is improper. 
19 If he wants to move to have you disqualified, I would like to 
20 address that motion. But I don't think he can get an 
21 advisory ruling in advance because some evidence is 
22 irrelevant. 
23 THE COURT: You know what's happened now? You've 
24 colored this whole case. You've colored it by even raising 
25 the issue. And so therefore, I just withdraw. 
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MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, could I speak to that? 
THE COURT: No. No. If11 just 
MR. ALLRED: I'll, accept that, Your Honor, if 
that's the Court's judgment. 
,
 :
 * THE COURT: And If11 withdraw as determining this 
case and then Mr. Allred, I'd like to see you in my chambers. 
•--.•'-_-• MR. ALLRED: I'll come in, Your honor. Thank you. 
; ' MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, I think I ought to get 
all my costs and attorneys fees. He was advised of this 
yesterday. 
- THE COURT: I know. And I'm leaning towards the 
variable costs and attorneys fees for the day. 
MR. MCDONALD: To Mr. Allred? 
(Proceedings Concluded) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF TOOELE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Trial on the case of JANNA 
GRIFFITH, vs. DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, was electronically 
recorded by the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, 
State of Utah. 
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly 
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth in said cause. 
That the said testimony of said witnesses was 
electronically recorded, and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into type writing, and that a true, and correct 
transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed is 
set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from 1 to 214, 
inclusive and said witnesses testified and said as in the 
foregoing annexed testimony. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 12th day of June, 1996. 
Qjfh^M. 
My Commission Expires: 
David A. Thacker, RPR 
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yf State of Utah ^
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October 17, 1996 
FILED BY. 
Tooele County Courthouse 
Clerk of the District Court * 
47 South Main . . ' . _ . " . 
Tooele, UT 84074 
Re: Griffith vs. Griffith 
Case No. 94430281 DA 
Please be advised that in reviewing the tapes of proceedings in the above-entitled matter 
held on March 13 and 14, 1996,7 we have found two errors in the transcript we prepared and 
have made the following corrections: -v; ^ «,.v;-r • ^ ;r:] ' ;v .::- «.-•*•••* - - . -
Page 16, line 23: Replace Mr. Allred with Mr. McDonald 
Page 213, line 5: T Replace "I'll withdraw as determining this case withffI will 
withdraw as the attorney in this case." 
Two new pages are attached reflecting these changes to replace the old ones. 
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because the defendant had all of the benefits available 
through his father's business. I think he's a shareholder, 
but -- we're going to put something on shares as well, I 
believe. All of the benefits that Christensen and Griffith 
had showered on David and Janna Griffith, the parties in this 
action prior, they're still available, they're still there 
and I don't think that the Court should even consider cutting 
Janna off the continuation of this living standard, this 
living style, is possible and that's what we're going to show 
the Court and be done here. And that's what we're asking and 
that's why that $1,800 figure's there. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just one minute. I'd like to call your 
attention. I was not aware that Paul Griffith is a brother 
to the defendant here. I had a conversation with him the 
other day -- nothing to do with this case. I just wanted to 
let you know I did have a conversation. He and I have a 
common ailment that the doctor suggested I talk to him. He 
called me. And I want to call that to your attention, but in 
no way did I discuss this case or even know until this 
morning, I read the -- your memorandum that they were 
brothers. But I just mention that to you. 
MR. MCDONALD: I have no problem with that. 
THE COURT: So I don't want anybody saying --
well, you know -- I don't know him -- I just talked to him 
<&? 001618 
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MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, could I speak to that? 
THE COURT: No, No. I'll just --
MR ALLRED: I'll accept that, Your Honor, if 
that's the Court's judgment. 
THE COURT: And I will withdraw as the attorney in 
this case and then Mr. Allred, I'd like to see you in my 
chambers. 
MR. ALLRED: I'll come in, Your Honor. Thank you. 
MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, I think I ought to get 
all my costs and attorneys fees. He was advised of this 
yesterday. 
THE COURT: I know. And I'm leaning towards the 
variable costs and attorneys fees for the day. 
MR. MCDONALD: To Mr. Allred? 
(Proceedings Concluded) 
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In the Third District Court of Tooele County -;.'. 
State of Utah ?„ ,. 
JANNA GRIFFITH, 
VS. 





Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant submitted a motion for judgment for costs and 
attorney fees and order of recusal. Plaintiff's counsel 
submitted a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion for 
judgment for costs and attorney fees and the recusal order. 
The issue of fees, costs and recusal arose as a result of 
the court recusing itself from the case after a full day of 
trial. 
Prior to beginning the trial the court advised the parties 
that after reading the trial brief on the morning of the trial it 
had discovered that Paul Griffith, brother of the Defendant, was 
a prospective witness. The court upon hearing that fact, advised 
the parties that Paul Griffith had called the court to inform him 
about the affects of interferon treatments which he was 
undergoing and the court was to begin. The call by Paul Griffith 
was made at the request of the treating physician. The court 
explained he and Paul Griffith discussed activity level and the 
ability to continue riding horseback while undergoing the 
treatment. At no time during the conversation was the divorce 
discussed or that Paul Griffith was the brother of the Defendant. 
After divulging this information, the court asked if the 
parties had any objections to the court hearing the case. There 
were no objections raised. 
On the second day of trial Mr. Allred raised the issue 
regarding the unsolicited telephone call by Paul Griffith. The 
court corrected Mr. Allred by advising him that call was made by 
Paul Griffith at the request of our mutual doctor. 
Mr. Allred's suggestion that the court could be influenced 
by Paul Griffith's call is a serious allegation, although totally 
unfounded in this case, nevertheless casts a shadow of 
impropriety over the proceedings. When Mr. Allred suggested that 
the court could be influenced, it left the court with no 
alternative but for the court to recuse itself. If the court was 
to do otherwise, the parties would question whether they would 
receive a fair trial and that justice could be done. 
The court concluded that Mr. Allred acted in bad faith. Mr. 
Allred was informed of the telephone conversation with Mr. Paul 
Griffith and raised no objection. However on the second day of 
the trial he places the court in an untenable position of 
^ 001009 
suggesting that the court could be influenced by the telephone 
conversation, if not, then render a preliminary ruling on the 
relevancy of Mr. Paul Griffith's health in this case before the 
court heard all of the evidence. 
Mr. Allred attempted to manipulate the court which tainted 
the proceedings and caused the court to recuse itself. 
The court awards Defendant $4,542.00 for attorney fees and 
costs incurred as a result of the conduct of Plaintiff's counsel 
in this case. 
The order of recusal shall read as follows: The court 
recused itself from this case because of Mr. Allred's bad faith 
conduct in attempting to manipulate the court. 
Mr. McDonald shall prepare the appropriate orders in 
accordance with this memorandum decision. 
DATED on this O day of May, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
'jLt'fZM 
IN A ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Case No: 944300281 DA 
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Robert M. McDonald (2J75) 
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Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 





ORDER OF RECUSAL 
Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Trial of this matter commenced on March 14, 1996 before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, District Judge, sitting without a jury. Present at said hearing were Plaintiff and her 
attorney J. Franklin AUred and Defendant and his attorney, Robert M. McDonald. Prior 
to the commencement of the trial, the Court advised the parties that after reading the trial 
briefs the Court had discovered that Paul Griffith, the brother of Defendant, was a 
prospective witness. The Court advised the parties and their attorneys that Paul Griffith 




(Defendant's brother) had initiated a telephone call to the Court to inform the Court about 
the effects of interferon treatments which Paul Griffith was undergoing and which the Court 
was to begin. The Court further informed the parties that the call by Paul Griffith was 
made at the request of the physician treating the Court and Paul Griffith. The Court 
explained that the Court and Paul Griffith discussed the activity level and the ability to 
continue riding horseback while undergoing treatment. The Court further advised the 
parties that at no time during the conversation was the divorce discussed, nor was there any 
discussion that Paul Griffith was the brother of Defendant. After fully disclosing the 
existence and subject matter of the telephone conversation, the Court inquired if the parties 
had any objections to the Court hearing the case. Neither party nor their attorneys voiced 
any objection to the Court proceeding with the trial. On the second day of trial, Mr. Allred 
raised the issue regarding the unsolicited telephone call by Paul Griffith. The Court 
corrected Mr. Allred by advising him that the call was made by Paul Griffith at the request 
of the physician treating both the Court and Paul Griffith. At that time, Mr. Allred clearly 
suggested that the Court could be influenced by Paul Griffith's telephone call which the 
Court regarded as a serious allegation. Although the suggestion of influence was totally 
unfounded, the Court regards the allegation as serious thereby casting a shadow of 
impropriety over the proceedings. Mr. Alfred's suggestion that the Court could be 
influenced left the Court with no alternative but to recuse itself from presiding over the trial 
of the matter. If the Court were to do otherwise, the parties would question whether they 
had received a fair trial and that justice had been served. On the basis of these facts, the 
Court entered a Minute Entry dated May 6, 1996, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
On the basis of the facts herein noted, and the facts noted in the Minute Entry dated 
May 6, 1996, the Court enters the following findings and conclusions: 
1. In failing to object to the Court presiding over the trial of the matter at the 
time of the disclosure of the telephone communication with Paul Griffith, and thereafter 
proceeding to call witnesses during the course of the trial, Plaintiff and her attorney waived 
any right to disqualify the Court from proceeding in the matter. Rule 63(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
2. Mr. Alfred's later suggestion that the Court could be influenced by the 
telephone communication with Paul Griffith is a serious allegation. Although said allegation 
is unfounded in this case, such allegation casts a shadow of impropriety over the proceedings 
leaving the Court with no alternative but to recuse itself from presiding over the trial of the 
matter. 
3. Mr. Alfred's conduct in failing to object to the Court presiding over the trial, 
until after the first trial day had been completed, constitutes bad faith on the part of Mr. 
Alfred. Said action constitutes an attempt to manipulate the Court and thereby taint the 
proceedings compelling the Court to recuse itself from presiding over the trial of the matter. 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
l. The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge, hereby recuses himself from 
presiding over the trial of this matter inasmuch as Paul Griffith will appear as a witness at 
the trial and the suggestion of Plaintiffs counsel that the Court would be unduly influenced 
3
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by the telephone communication with Paul Griffith compels the Court to recuse itself from 
presiding over the trial of this matter. 
2. The Court recuses itself from this case because of Mr. Allred's bad faith 
conduct in attempting to manipulate the Court. 
3. Inasmuch as Mr. Allred's suggestion of undue influence arising out of the 
Court's communication with Paul Griffith has no bearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Judgment for Costs and Attorney's fees, this Order does not prevent the Court from 
considering and ruling on said motion. 
DATED on this J% / d a y of May, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this .V> day of May, 1996, I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF RECUSAL to the 
following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 







Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Jennifer P. Lee (6765) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801)485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The Court having considered Defendant's Motion for Judgment for Costs and 
Attorneys fees, Affidavit of Robert M. McDonald, Defendant's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Judgment for Costs and Attorneys fees, Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment for Costs and Attorney's fees and to 
Defendant's Proposed Order of Recusal and the Affidavit of John Franklin Allred, and 
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having fully considered the facts and circumstances occurring during the course of trial of 
this matter, as reflected in the minute entry dated May 6,1996, which is incorporated herein 
by reference, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court incorporates by reference, as if fully set forth herein, the Findings 
stated in the Minute Entry dated May 6, 1996. 
2. In failing to object to the Court presiding over the trial of the matter at the 
time of the disclosure of the telephone communication with Paul Griffith, and thereafter 
proceeding to call witnesses during the course of the trial, Plaintiff and her attorney waived 
any right to disqualify the Court from proceeding in the matter. Rule 63(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
3. J. Franklin Allred's later suggestion that the Court could be influenced by the 
telephone communication with Paul Griffith is a serious allegation. Although said allegation 
is unfounded in this case, such allegation casts a shadow of impropriety over the proceedings 
leaving the Court with no alternative but to recuse itself from presiding over the trial of the 
matter. 
4. J. Franklin Allred's conduct in failing to object to the Court presiding over the 
trial until after the first trial day had been completed, constitutes bad faith on the part of 
Mr. Allred. Said action constitutes an attempt to manipulate the Court and thereby taint 




5. The acts and omissions to act on the part of J. Franklin Allred were in bad 
faith and for an improper purpose to harass, to cause unnecessary delay and to cause a 
needless increase in Defendant's costs of litigation. 
6. By reason of the acts and omissions to act on the part of J. Franklin Allred, 
Defendant's attorney must expend at least twenty additional hours in duplicative preparation 
for a second trial. 
7. By reason of the acts and omissions to act on the part of J. Franklin Allred, 
Defendant was deprived of the benefit of 7.0 hours of his attorney's time incurred in travel 
and appearance at trial on March 14, 1996 and 2.6 hours in travel and appearance at trial 
on March 15, 1996. 
8. By reason of the acts and omissions to act on the part of J. Franklin Allred, 
Defendant's attorney has expended more than 2.6 hours in preparing an Order of Recusal, 
Motion for Judgment for Costs and Attorney's fees, Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Judgment for Costs and Attorney's fees, Affidavit, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment. 
9. The hourly rate for Defendant's attorney is $140 per hour. Said rate is fair 
and reasonable in light of Defendant's attorney's experience in civil litigation in domestic 
relations matters. 
10. The hours spent in appearance at trial, and duplicative preparation are 
necessary to adequately represent Defendant in this action and the number of hours, in light 
of the nature of the service, is fair and reasonable. 
-3-
^ ^ 001179 
11. By reason of the acts and omissions to act on the part of J. Franklin Allred, 
Defendant was deprived of the benefit of travel costs incurred by his attorney in appearing 
at trial on March 14 and 15, 1996. The travel costs in appearing at trial on said dates is 
$34.00 and said travel was necessary and the amount charged for said travel is fair and 
reasonable. 
12. At all times mentioned herein, J. Franklin Allred was acting as attorney of 
record for Plaintiff and the acts of J. Franklin Allred are imputed to Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court incorporates by reference, as if fully set forth herein, the 
Conclusions stated in the Minute Entry dated May 6, 1996. 
2. Judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant, and against Plaintiff and 
her attorney, J. Franklin Allred, jointly and severally, in the sum of $4,542. Said judgment 
to hereafter bear interest at the rate of 7.35% per annum from date of entry until said 
judgment is satisfied. 
DATED on this tf / d a y of May, 1996. 
BYTHE COURT 
&-f^ ST 
ISTR1CT COURT JUDGE 
/o& 001178 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this jQ day of May, 1996, I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
a :v \vpdocs\gri ft! t h\f i nd. t'ac 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Jennifer P. Lee (6765) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801)485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J ANN A GRIFFITH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
J ANNA GRIFFITH, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 944300281 DA 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The Court having considered Defendant's Motion for Judgment for Costs and 
Attorney's fees, Affidavit of Robert M. McDonald, Defendant's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Judgment for Costs and Attorney's fees, Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment for Costs and Attorney's fees and to 
Defendant's Proposed Order of Recusal and the Affidavit of John Franklin Allied, and 
having fully considered the facts and circumstances occurring during the course of the trial 
' # 
; K I. 
of this matter as reflected in the minute entry dated May 6, 1996, which is incorporated 
herein by reference, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby entered for 
and on behalf of Defendant/Counterelaimant David Gary Griffith and against Plaintiff Janna 
Griffith and attorney J. Franklin Allred, jointly and severally, in the sum of $4,542. Said 
judgment shall hereafter bear interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 7.35% per annum 
from date of entry. 
DATED on this c ^ / day of May, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
^ 
TRICT COURT J'UDGE 
soy °01175 
* / 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED P.C., A0058 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
c- n 
FILED BY. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF J. FRANKLIN 
ALLRED IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Judge Lee Dever 
Case No.944300281 DA 
The Plaintiff above-named by and through her attorney, J. 
Franklin Allred, having prayed in her complaint herein for an award 
of attorney's fees, now submits the following affidavit of J. 
Franklin Allred in support of said award. 
State of Utah 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
J. Franklin Allred being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I am the attorney for the Plaintiff above-named and 
have personal direct knowledge of each action taken in this case 
1 CIVIL\GRIFFITH\AFFIDAV2. JFA 
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and have personally conducted or overseen and authorized the 
expenditure of time and effort in this matter by me and by the 
other attorney's who contributed to the conduct of this litigation. 
2. This being a domestic matter and the Plaintiff having 
requested an attorney's fee award, the legal basis for said award 
is based upon Utah Code Annotated 30-3-3 and the cases reporting 
domestic actions. 
3. I have been in the private practice of law since June of 
1970 at the above address in Salt Lake City, Utah and have 
throughout that time been in engaged generally in a litigation 
practice and have litigated domestic matters extensively throughout 
the twenty-six plus years of my practice. 
4. I am generally aware of the charges made for lawyers with 
my experience for similar work in the domestic area. 
5. I agreed with my client to charge $175 an hour for all 
work conducted on her behalf and state that said sum is reasonable 
and consistent with charges generally in the domestic area made by 
attorneys of my experience and ability. 
6. The...-Specific identification of the steps taken -in the 
conduct of this litigation are outlined in the billings for my 
services which are attached hereto as Exhibits 1-6. The conduct of 
this litigation was greatly complicated by the intransigence of 
opposing counsel, the lack of readily available information as to 
earnings of the Defendant and the reluctance of the Defendant to 
CIVIIAGRIFFITHYAFFIDAV2.JFA 2 
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identify and provide value on his profit sharing plain. The steps 
taken by me as attorney for the Plaintiff as reflected in Exhibits 
1-6 were reasonable and necessary under the circumstance to fully 
protect Plaintiff's rights to child support, alimony, and an 
equitable property division. 
7. Throughout this litigation, the posture of Defendant with 
respect to every aspect has been to adopt and pursue an over-
bearing, unreasonable, unfair and irresponsible position to the 
point at the conclusion of the trial where the Defendant suggests 
after a twenty-year marriage that no alimony be awarded and that he 
be awarded attorney's fees because of the Plaintiff's efforts to 
vigorously pursue her interests. 
8. At no time was a reasonable division of the retirement 
fund suggested by Defendant; at no time was a reasonable alimony 
suggested by Defendant; at no time was a legitimate suggestion for 
child support made, all of which demanded the pursuit through trial 
for a fair division of the property and determination of child 
support and alimony for Plaintiff. 
9.. _ The original position of Defendant respecting both child 
support and alimony as stipulated to, was based on the affidavit of 
Plaintiff which identified approximately $67,000.00 of annual 
income to the Defendant and resulted in the stipulated award of 
temporary support of $1,298.00 per month and temporary alimony of 
$1,050.00 per month. 
CIVIL\GRIFFITH\AFFIDAV2.JFA . 3 
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) 
10. Defendant's entire effort has been to conceal his true 
earnings by understating them< to reduce the child support from the 
original temporary figure, to eliminate alimony, and to obtain the 
bulk of the most important asset, the parties' retirement funds, to 
him, which posture demanded a vigorous and resolute pursuit by 
Plaintiff to secure her fair and equitable interest in the 
property, child support and alimony. 
11. The time expended by counsel was reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances and Plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed 
in full. 
12. The remaining outstanding balance owing from Plaintiff to 
J. Franklin Allred for attorney's fees, advanced costs, and 
expenses paid for the services of other lawyers is $75,533.61 and 
Plaintiff is entitled to an order of the Court awarding her said 
sum. 
DATED this /Cy day of August, 1996 
JKLIN ALLRED 
Attorney of the Plaintifj 
CIVIL\GRIFFITH\AFFIDAV2.JFA 
//3 001520 
State of Utah 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
J. Franklin Allred being, duly sworn and disposed on his oath, 
states that the contents herein are true. 




NOTARY PUBUC C = = ""T ( 
SUZANNE L GRIGGS [; 
c/o Edward K. Brass 
321 South 600 East i: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 r 
My Commission Expires 10/10/98 li 
STATE OF UTAH _n 
GBEO QB3 S H I EBB M B CX9 *•' ' -' * * 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
^ 
I hereby certify that on this /{^S day of August, 1996, I 
caused to be mailed to Robert M. McDonald, the attorney for the 
Defendant above named, at McDonald & West, 3269 South Main, Suite 
270, Salt Lake City UT 84115, the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF J. 





J \ F R A N K L I N A L L R E D P 
ATTORNEY & COUNSELOR AT LAW 
321 SOUTH SIXTH EAST 
S A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84I02-408& 
AREA CODE OOI 
TELEPHONE 53I-IOOO 
March 11, 1996 
STATEMENT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 












Office Conf. w/ client 
Office Conf. w/ client 
Preparation of Complaint, telephone Conf. w/ Janna 
Work on Complaint 
Work on Complaint 
Work on child support schedules, telephone Conf. w/ 
client 
Work on Complaint, file Complaint, telephone Conf. w. 
client 
Conf. w/ client at bank 
Work on Affidavit, telephone Conf. w/ client 
Court Hearing 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. 
with travel one way 
Defendant's Order to Show Cause 












10/17/94 Finalize Order, Letter to client, copy to client, 
Copy of Order and Letter to Counsel .40 
//f 001518 
" \ 
10/28/94 Telephone Conf. w/ Janna 
Letter to Richards 
11/02/94 Letter to Richards 
11/11/94 Telephone Conf. w/Janna 
11/21/94 Preparation, letter and Order to Show Cause, 








Total Hours at $175.00 per hour 
10/11/94 Service for Pleadings 







Total Balance for period 
Retainer 
Less Current Bill 
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J". F R A N K L I N A L L R E D P.< 
ATTORNEY & COUNSELOR AT LAW 
321 SOUTH SIXTH EAST 
S A L T LAKE GITY, UTAH 8 4 i o s - 4 0 8 s 
AREA CODE 801 
TELEPHONE B3I-IQBO 
STATEMENT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
JANUARY 1, 1995, TO MARCH 31, 1995 
March 11, 1996 
Balance or Credit 
02/02/95 Letter to Opposing Counsel regarding visitation 
Review of Motion to Amend 





Work on memorandum in opposition 
Amend, finalize and mail 
Telephone Conf. with Janna 
Telephone Conf. with McDonald 
Telephone Conf. with Client 
Letter to Counsel with Ex's 
Total hours 
Total hours at $175.00 per hour 
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Credit ($3,312.00) 
Less Current balance $957.59 
Balance due or Credit ($ 2.354.411 
STATEMEN\GR1FFITH\STATEMEN.T1 
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<J. F R J V N X L I N A L L R E D PC 
ATTORNEY & COUNSELOR AT LAW 
321 SOUTH SIXTH EAST 
S A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84108-4088 
AREA CODE SOI 
TELEPHONE 5 3 1 - 1 9 9 0 
STATEMENT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
APRIL 1, 1995 TO DECEMBER 31, 1995 
March 11, 1996 
Balance or Credit (S 2.354.4n 
04/07/95 Phone Conference with Client, 0.30 hours (No Charge) 
08/07/95 Prepare Motion for Order Compelling Discovery 
File Motion with Judge Rokich and McDonald 
08/08/95 Phone Conference with McDonald 
08/14/95 Court Hearing with Judge Rokich in Tooele 
Phone Conference with Donna McKendricks 
08/15/95 Phone Conference with Client 
Phone Conference with McDonald 
Phone Conference with McDonald 
Phone Conference with McDonald 
Phone Conference with Client (No Charge) 
08/16/95 Phone Conference with McDonald 
Pick Up Deeds from Recorder 
08/17/95 Phone Conference with McDonald 
Phone Conference with McDonald, 
P. V. Documents 
Letter To McDonald RE: Documents Not Produced 

















/ / & 
• ^ 
08/18/95 Dictation of Notices of Deposition, Phone Conference, 
08/18/95 Subpoenas, Edit Notices 
08/21/95 Edit Notices, Prepare Subpoenas, Review Documents 
08/22/95 Work on Notices of Deposition, Subpoenas 
Phone Conference with McDonald, 
P. V. Documents 
08/23/95 Conference with Client in Tooele, 
P. V. Subpoenas, Leave Documents 
Review Documents, Prepare for Deposition 
08/24/95 Deposition 9:00 a.m. - p.m. 
08/25/95 Ost. Defendant's Signature on Check, 
Conference with Client, Organize File 
08/28/95 Letter to McDonald, Write Check 
09/01/95 Prepare Order on Motion to Compel, 
Letter to Opposing Counsel, Letter to Client 
09/20/95 Phone Conference with Client 
Phone Conference with McDonald 
09/21/95 Phone Conference with Client 
09/25/95 Notice of Deposition, Subpoena to Ken Christensen 
10/06/95 Letter to Opposing Counsel 
10/07/95 Work on Motion for Contempt 
10/09/05 Dictate, Edit Affidavit, Motion for Contempt 

























10/12/95 Findings, Motion, Mail with Affidavit, etc. 
11/20/95 Conference with Client, 
Deliver Copy of Response of Defendant to Motion 
11/28/95 Draft Reply to Response to Motion for Contempt, 
Draft Affidavit 
12/01/95 Edit, Revise Reply to Motion for Contempt 
12/05/95 Final Edit, Copy, Mail Reply to Motion for Contempt 
12/11/95 Court Hearing, Argue Motion 
12/11/95 Received Letter from McDonald regarding Discovery 
Review Deposition 
12/12/95 Research Deposition, notes or stipulation to provide info on 
Discovery. 
12/13/95 Review notes and deposition, draft letter response. 
12/14/95 Letter to McDonald, revise, fax and mail. 
12/15/95 Telephone Conf with McDonald 
Received and reviewed motion 
12/16/95 Read Motion, discuss with Ed Brass and review 
12/17/95 Work on outline or response, read depositions 
12/18/95 Write Memorandum 
Conf w/ Clark Arnold 
12/19/95 Affidavit of J. Franklin Allred and edit 
Affidavit of Janna and revise 
12/20/95 Copy, file and serve Response to Motion to Compel 
12/26/95 Conference w/Liz Hunt 
























12/27/95 Prepare additional discovery request, revise copy 2.00 
12/28/95 File and serve Motion to Contempt 
Request for Discovery 
12/29/95 Prepare Motion Extending Time, prepare Notice to 
submit, Memorandum supporting Motion 
Total Hours 







09/15/95 Sum Advance for Deposition 
09/15/95 Sum Advance for Transcript of Hearing 
10/11/95 Sum Advance 
12/11/95 Sum Advance 
12/19/95 Sum Advance 
12/20/95 Sum Advance 
12/20/95 Sum Advance 
12/28/95 Sum Advance 










Total fees due 
Total advanced sum 
Total 
Less credit 









August 1, 1996 
STATEMENT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
JANUARY 1, 1996 TO MARCH 31, 1996 
Balance or Credit 
01/02/96 Phone Conf. Liz Hunt and Ed Brass 
Review and research drafts 
01/03/96 Draft Affidavit J. Franklin Allred 
Draft Affidavit Janna Griffith 
01/04/96 Revise - Rewrite facts 
Response to Motion for Limine 
01/05/96 Revise, copy, file Motion Disq. 









01/17/96 Notice to Submit, Motion to Disq. 
01Z23/96 Received Motion for Sanctions, Reviewed reply draft 
01/25/96 Final Response to Sanctions, Conf. with McDougal 
and Ed Brass 
01/26/96 Work on Affidavit's of Brass, MacDougal, Allred and 
Janna Griffith 
01/26/96 Final, file, copies to J. Dever in Salt Lake City 










01/30/96 Work on Response to Motion for Sanctions 
02/02/96 File and serve Response to Motion for Sanctions 
02/05/96 Prep. Objection to Orders, Motion for Hearing on Objections 
02/12/96 Final and file Memorandum supporting Objections to Orders 
02/12/96 Prepare Subpoenas 
02/16/96 Serve Subpoenas 
03/02/96 Work on files & prepare for trial. 
03/04/96 Trial preparations 
03/05/96 Trial preparations and discovery 
03/07/96 Trial preparation 










Conference with Thell Stewart 
Trial preparation 
Trial preparations, review, mar 
03/14/96 
Conf. W/Thell Stewart, Brass, and Liz Hunt. 
Trial 
03/15/96 Trial, Conf. with client, travel (1) 


























03/21/96 Rev. Motion of Defendant for Attorney Fees, 
Memorandam, telephone Conf. w/ Liz 
03/26/96 Preparration of response to Motion, scheduled conf, 
Request for schedule con, file response. 
Total Hours 




















Total advanced sum 
Total fee hours due 
Total advanced sum 
Total charge for billing period 


























August 5, 1996 
STATEMENT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
APRIL 1, 1996 TO JULY 11, 1996 
Balance or Credit 
04/04/96 Conf. with RoEna, regarding Rokich 
Pickup Motion, oral tapes, etc. 
04/04/96 Conf. with RoEna, pickup tapes 
04/24/96 Pick up tapes, conference with RoEna 
05/07/96 Liz Hunt 
5/15/96 Motion to Vacate Minute Entry, Memo, Affidavit 
Conf. with Liz, 
5/16/96 Motion reopen, order, Memo Objection to Proposed 
Order, Affidavit, etc. 
5/24/96 Conf. Liz Hunt 
Review & edit Motion to Vacate/State 
File 
5/26/96 Review Memo and Motion to vacate Minute Entry 
5/26/96 Review Motion Bifurcate, Rev. Temporary Order, 
Motion to Modify Temporary Order 
5/26/96 Review Motion, Defendant's Objection to Proposed 


















5/27/96 Telephone Conf. With Janna, review files, 
Motion etc., for hearing 1.00 
5/28/96 Court, Conf. with client 2.00 
Travel .50 
5/30/96 Prepare, Serve and mail Judgment, letter to J. Dever 1.20 
5/31/96 Prepare Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate Minutes Entry and file 3.00 
6/1/96 Preparation of Supporting Affidavit of J. Franklin Allred 
Response to Minute Entry 1.50 
6/2/96 Edit final Supporting Affidavit of J. Franklin Allred 
Execute 2.00 
6/2/96 Prepare Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendant's 
Opp. Memo to Plaintiff Obj. to Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Judgement 2.00 
6/2/96 Prepare Plaintiff's Memo Opp. T Defendant's Motion 
Red. Alimony; Prepare Plaintiff's Motion Rule 11 
Sanctions, Attorney's Fees 2.00 
6/2/96 File and serve Affidavit, conf. with client, Plaintiff's 
Reply to Defendants Objection to Plaintiff's Objection to 
Finding of Facts, Conclusion of Law and Judgment 2.00 
6/3/96 Prepare Affidavit of J. Franklin Allred, Response to Defendant's 
claim of Stipulation to Witnesses, Reply to Defendant 
opposition to Reopen Discovery 1.40 
6/4/96 Notice to Submit Plaintiff's Objections to Proposed Order of .30 
Recusal etc; Notice to Submit Motion to Reopen Discovery .30 
6/6/96 Rec'd. Defendant's Memorandum Opp. to Plaintiff Motion, 




6/10/96 Dictate and review PlaintifFs Reply to Defendant's Opposition 1.00 
to Plaintiff Motion, Plaintiff Reply to Defendant's Opposition 2.50 
6/12/96 Final Reply to Defendant's Memo in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Relief/Stay 2.30 
Serve Notice to Submit .20 
6/12/96 Request Transcript - Motion to Change Bond on Appeal .50 
6/13/96 Rec'd. Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Notice to Submit 
Plaintiffs Objection to Order, Judgment, Finding of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, Regarding Hearing/ Rec'd. Affidavit of 
McDonald .10 
6/14/96 Conference with Liz Hunt 
Review Affidavit of McDonald and research 
.30 
.20 
6/20/96 Motion to Strike McDonald's Affidavit and Memo .70 
6/20/96 Prepare Memo in Opposition of Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs Notice to Submit 1.00 
6/21/96 Received Notice of Hearing and status, phone conf. 
w/ client 
6/24/96 Prepare Motion Cert. Order as Final 
6/25/96 Prepare Subpoenas 
6/25/96 Review and copy Parts of transcript, prepare Notice of 
Filing exhibits 
6/25/96 Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant Memo, Plaintiffs Motion 
for relief from Judgment, Plaintiff reply to Defendant's 
Memo in to Plaintiff s Motion for Stay 
7/5/96 Received Defendant's Reply of Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant Motion to Strike Plaintiff Notice to Submit, 










7/11/96 Prepare Reply Memo in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
to Strike Affidavit of McDonald 
Total Hours 






















Total advanced sum 
Total fee hours due 
Total advanced sum 
Total charge for billing period 























August 14, 1996 
STATEMENT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
JULY 13 TO AUGUST 14, 1996 
Balance or Credit 
07/13/96 OC work on exhibits, plan, 
Review checking accounts 
07/15/96 Rec. Motion for Pmt. Bond. 
Review 
07/16/96 Dictate Plaintiffs Response in Opposition 
to Motion of Defendant for Pmt. Bond 
07/18/96 Letter from McDonald re: deposition 
Phone conference - Liz Hunt; OC Liz Hunt rev. 
07/19/96 Phone conference - Janna Griffith re: format of ERS 
07/20/96 Final Objections to deposition of Paul Griffith 
07/21/96 OC; prepare for trial 
07/22/96 Court hearing/ Judge Dever/ Tooele 
07/23/96 Letter to McDonald witness at this time; 
Order copy for Court 
07/23/96 OC; trial preparation 
07/25/96 OC; trial preparation 


















07/27/96 OC; trial preparation 
08/01/96 Rec. Defendant's Response to Objections; prepare 
Request Supplement 
08/02/96 Review trial brief; prepara for films 




08/05/96 Rec/rev. deposition of Paul Griffith 
Trial preparation 
08/05/96 Trial preparation 
Trial preparation; OC 




08/09/96 Prepare Motion to Re-open on Stay; 
File Motion 
08/11/96 Trial preparation 
08/12/96 Trial preparation; re-do Exhibits; copy 
Documents for Motion, etc.; rev. Exhibit 
List for completeness 
08/13/96 Trial 

























Total fee due @ $175.00 per hour $19,180.00 
Sums Advanced: 
7/20/96 Sum advanced 45.00 
Total advanced sum $45.00 
Total fee hours due $19,180.00 
Total advanced sum $45.00 
Total charge for billing period $19,225.00 
Balance due from Statement 04/01/96 to 07/11/96 $57,302.89 
Balance $76,527.89 
Less XA of Insurance Check $994.28 
BALANCE DUE $75.533.61 
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